Jump to navigation Jump to search
|A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z &
- Volume 1
- Volune 2
- A name is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronounced to others may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker had before in his mind. (p. 27)
- Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not6 indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals. When we name a child by the name Mary, or a dog by the name Caesar, these names are simply marks used to enable those individuals to be make subjects of discourse. It may be said, indeed, that we must have had some reason for giving them those names rather than any others: and this is true; but the name, once given, becomes independent of the reason. A man may have been named John because that was the name of his father; a town may have been Dartmouth, because it is situated at the mouth of the Dart. But it is no part of the signification of the word John, that the father of the person so called bore the same name; nor even of the word Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the Dart. If sand should choke up the mouth of the river, or an earthquake change its course, and remove it to a distance from the town, there is no reason to think that the name of the town would be changed. That fact, therefore, can form no part of the signification of the word; for otherwise, when the fact ceased to be true, the name would cease to be applied. Proper names are attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent upon the continuance of any attribute of the object. (p. 40)
- Huxley, Aldous (1940). Words and Their Meanings. The Ward Ritchie Press, 1940. [^]
- Richards, I. A. (1936). The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Oxford University Press. [^]
- Korzybski, Alfred (1933). Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. 5th ed., Institute of General Semantics, 1994. [^]
- Magritte, René (1933). The Human Condition (La condition humaine). National Gallery of Art, Washington DC. [^]
- Wells, H. G. (1933). The Shape of Things to Come. Hutchinson. [^]
- Empson, William (1930). Seven Types of Ambiguity, 2nd ed., London: Chatto & Windus, 1949. [^]
- Frank, Jerome (1930). Law and the Modern Mind. Peter Smith, 1930. [^]
- Ogden, C. K. (1930). Basic English: A General Introduction with Rules and Grammar. London: Paul Treber. [^]
- Magritte, René (1929). The Treachery of Images (La trahison des images). Los Angeles County Museum of Art, Los Angeles, California. [^]
- Russell, Bertrand (1926). "The Meaning of Meaning." Dial, vol.81 (August 1926) pp. 114-121. [^]
- Ogden, C. K. & I. A. Richards (1923). The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. [^]
- Wells, H. G. (1923). Men Like Gods. Cassell and Co., Ltd. [^]
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Frank P. Ramsey & C. K. Ogden, trans., Kegan Paul, 1922. [^]
- Russell, Bertrand (1921). The Analysis of Mind. London: George Allen & Unwin. [^]
- Welby, Victoria Lady (1911). Significs and Language: The Articulate Form of Our Expressive and Interpretive Resources. H. Walter Schmitz, ed., John Benjamins, 1985. [^]
- Russell, Bertrand (1905). "On Denoting." Mind, vol. 14, pp. 479-493. [^]
- Wells, H. G. (1905). A Modern Utopia. New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2005. [^]
- Welby, Victoria Lady (1903). What Is Meaning? Studies in the Development of Significance. John Benjamins.
- Bréal, Michel (1897). Semantics: Studies in the Science of Meaning. Nina Cust, trans., J. P. Postgate, ed. (1900).
- Welby, Victoria Lady (1896). "Sense, meaning, and interpretation I" Mind 5: 24–37.
- Welby, Victoria Lady (1896). "Sense, meaning, and interpretation II" Mind 5: 186–202.
- Welby, Victoria Lady (1893). "Meaning and metaphor," Monist 3: 510–525.
- Frege, Gottlob (1892). "Über Sinn und Bedeutung," ("On Sense and Reference"), Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100: 25-50. [^]
- Mill, John Stuart (1843). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. John W. Parker. [^]