Neocameralism is a system, originally proposed by Dark Enlightenment philosopher Curtis Yarvin and inspired by Prussian cameralism, in which a state is a business which owns a country.
"Let’s start with my ideal world – the world of thousands, preferably even tens of thousands, of neocameralist city-states and ministates, or neostates. The organizations which own and operate these neostates are for-profit sovereign corporations, or sovcorps. For the moment, let’s assume a one-to-one mapping between sovcorp and neostate."-Curtis Yarvin from Unqualified Reservations
"Let’s pin down the neocameralist dramatis personae by identifying the people who work for a sovcorp as its agents, the people or organizations which collectively own it as its subscribers, and the people who live in its neostate as its residents."-Curtis Yarvin
A Neocameral ‘neostate’ is not owned by its residents or its agents. Its ‘head of state’ (or ‘CEO’) is an executive appointment.
"Every patch of land on the planet has a primary owner, which is its sovcorp. Typically, these owners will be large, impersonal corporations. We call them sovcorps because they’re sovereign. You are sovereign if you have the power to render any plausible attack on your primary property, by any other sovereign power, unprofitable. In other words, you maintain general deterrence… The business of a sovcorp is to make money by deterring aggression. Since human aggression is a serious problem, preventing it should be a good business. Moreover, the existence of unprofitable governments in your vicinity is serious cause for concern, because unprofitable governments tend to have strange decision structures and do weird, dangerous things… General deterrence is a complex topic which deserves its own post. For the moment, assume that every square inch of the planet’s surface is formally owned by some sovcorp, that no one disagrees on the borders, and that deterrence between sovcorps is absolute."-Curtis Yarvin
"This does not solve the problem of constructing a stable sovcorp. The central problem of governance is the old Latin riddle: who guards the guardians? The joint-stock corporate design solves the central problem by entrusting guardianship in the collective decisions of the corporation’s owners, voting not by head but by percentage of profit received… The joint-stock model is hundreds of years old. It is as proven as proven can be…"-Curtis Yarvin
The point of formalizing CEO's as governors, joint-stock corporate design and share-dividends is the elimination of aggression or violence in order to have a stable neostate or government. The point of formalism, rather than have things under a regular statism and neo-liberal system and having political consensus based on power, history and culture, the elected statesmen and unelected elite like for example government, media, academia and research institutions who are the source of cultural power, is to ensure that all incentives lead toward sane and peaceful behavior. Unlike anarcho-capitalism there is a high level of individual freedom that is derived from their law and order that puts a stop to any unnecessary aggression, the only abuse that would occur is against those patrons that present a security problem.
"A rational monopoly neostate still has no motivation to personally abuse its patrons. It would always rather tax than abuse, and why not just forget the abuse altogether?"-Curtis Yarvin
The neocameralist patchwork is the idea that sovcorps will rather than conglomerate and solidify into a megasovcorps, in other words large mergers and acquisitions, there are concrete reasons to keep this from happening due to patrons. Sovcorps will prefer to only extend permisseability to make private investments (become subscribers) into that sovcorp and whom requires those subscribers to be a resident to make legal purchases of shares in that sovcorp, where as the subscribers will prefer sovcorps without this law on the books and will prefer neostates that don't make unnecessary demands on them and has a good rule of law. This preference of sovcorps will also include the restriction that prevents a suspicious combination of shares from being bought without the necessary deterrence of illegality being the case and the resultant massive price plummets on that occupied businesses that could result in a hostile or friendly takeover. When the sovcorp fails to hold this restriction and if the non-resident owner enters into this contract illegally and uses fronts to purchase alot of shares, in other words, that friendly or hostile purchaser violates this restriction in place (the restriction by a covenant to prevent chain states from forming, or a suspicious combination of shares that could result in a takeover) then they will find that their businesses value will have a huge collapse in value than what they paid for it because they illegally purchased it.
"One way is for subscriber covenants to prohibit chain states, or suspicious combinations of shares that might result in a chain state."-Curtis Yarvin
The point of having such internal law is that it will make for a stable sovcorp, since it prevents anyone, hostile or not, from doing an massive consolidation to prevent competitors from being able to viably exist and compete with that sovcorp over residents "rents" (tax). Every sovcorp will want to keep their rents low in order to be able to remain solvent when up against competitor sovcorps, every sovcorp naturally wants to get bigger to an extent where they are big enough or hold enough monopoly power to not be forced to lower their rents below or near the level of their competition, but without that growth being due to a takeover. The sovcorp has a interest in preventing conglomerates, the sovcorp will want to make internal laws such that all their important businesses shares aren't taken away and so that all the subscribers or share-holders remain as active participants in the future of the sovcorp, rather than having them all (inevitably if the restriction is floundered by the CEO) undergo mass consolidation and won't be the CEO's and board members anylonger and the existing share-holders may become non-majority share-holders in the future. Thus they wish to organically grow the business rather than be swallowed up by any hostile or friendly takeovers as much as can be prevented against.