Literature/2000/Fodor

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Fodor, Jerry (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press.

Excerpts

Over the years, I've written a number of books in praise of the Computational Theory of Mind.... It is, in my view, by far the best theory of cognition that we've got; indeed, the only one we've got that's worth the bother of a serious discussion. There are facts about the mind that it accounts for and that we would be utterly at a loss to explain without it; and its central idea -- that intentional processes are syntactic operations defined on mental representations -- is strikingly elegant. There is, in short, every reason to suppose that the Computational Theory is part of the truth about cognition. (p. 1)

Fodor, Jerry (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press. ^{[^]}
Fodor, Jerry (1998). The Trouble with Psychological Darwinism." London Review of Books. Vol. 20 No. 2 (22 January 1998) pp. 11-13. ^{[^]}
Fodor, Jerry (1998). In Critical Condition. MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry (1996). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. The 1996 John Locke Lectures. Oxford University Press, 1998.
Pinker, Steven (1997). How the Mind Works. W. W. Norton. ^{[^]}
Henry Plotkin (1997). Evolution in Mind: An Introduction to Evolutionary Psychology. Allen Lane.
Fodor, Jerry (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry (1983). The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry (1979). Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press. ^{[^]}