Is the 2022 Russian military operation in Ukraine justified?

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Is the 2022 Russian military operation in Ukraine justified?

The purpose of this debate, as often, is to examine arguments actually made and their weaknesses. The argument space is to be revealed before the eyes of the reader. The term "military operation" was chosen as in part neutral since each war is a military operation and each "special" military operation is a military operation. This debate is guided by the British ideas of free speech, including those by J.S.Mill; bad arguments are rendered less harmful by being clearly documented and criticized rather than being censored. If one is to understand the Russian mind, one needs to look at the low-grade content it is being fed, to investigate the demagogic power of Russian propaganda first-hand.

Russian 2022 military operation in Ukraine is justified

Arguments for

• Argument for Ukraine would develop nuclear weapons and threaten Russia.
  • Objection The above speculation is not based on any tangible facts and evidence, and is implausible on the whole.
  • Objection Russia's invasion ironically incentivizes Ukraine to develop its own WMD.
• Argument for Ukraine was increasing its military capacity greatly since 2014. This could not have been tolerated since it would endanger Russia.
  • Objection Even if developed, Ukraine does not have the military capacity to take on the much larger and richer Russia in terms of conventional capacity. Furthermore, Russia has nuclear deterrent, which Ukraine cannot and does not match. Russia's nuclear arsenal is largest in the world. If needed, Russia can use not only strategic (high-impact) nuclear weapons but also tactical (mid-impact) nuclear weapons.
• Argument for Ukraine government are Nazis. Nazism must not be tolerated.
  • Objection While some Nazi elements can be identified in Ukraine, the claim is implausible on the whole. There is no evidence that the government behaves like Nazis toward Russians. It does not behave like Nazis toward Jews. The Ukrainian government did not engage in any systematic extermination of any ethnic, or systematic imprisonment of any ethnic. There is no mandatory labeling for Russians on their clothing, an analog of the Jewish star. The likening of the Ukrainian government to Nazis does not remotely approach anything like truth in any way.
    • Objection While the Ukrainian government supports and flirts with the AB (w:Azov Regiment#Neo-Nazism), Russia didn't/doesn't. Unlike Zelenskyy, Russians don't give them medals, they shoot them.
  • Objection Assuming Kiev/Kyiv regime are Nazis for the sake of the argument, that is no justification for reckless missile attacks of civilian residential areas across Ukraine (not only in Kiev/Kyiv) and for attempted annexation of eastern Ukrainian territory.
    • Objection The Western Allies attacked civilian targets in Germany. The US killed lots of Japanese civilians in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Tokyo.
      • Objection Germany, Japan, and Italy were aggressive powers. Ukraine attacked no country. Presumably if Germany, Japan, and Italy didn't attack their neighbours, they wouldn't have been attacked by Western allies.

• Argument for Ukraine is part of Russia. Ukraine as a country is a fiction, and so are Ukrainians as a nation.
  • Objection In so far as Ukraine is internationally recognized sovereign country, it is not a fiction as a country.
  • Objection All countries are arguably fictional, at least abstractions. As far the nation of Russia, it is quite possibly as much a fiction as is the Ukrainian nation. What nations are or are not is a matter for philosophical debate. Nations do not matter all that much; sovereign countries and their peaceful coexistence in the age of nuclear weapons is what matters.
  • Objection When Russia signed W:Budapest Memorandum in 1994, which resulted in Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons, its position was not that Ukraine as a country was a fiction.
    • Objection US sanctions on Belarus in 2013 were a breach on article 3, and thus invalidated it.
• Argument for Modern Ukraine was created by Lenin, by the Bolshevik, communist Russia. As an expression of ingratitude, Ukrainians demolished monuments to Lenin in Ukraine.
  • Objection The w:Ukrainian People's Republic started in 1917/1918. It might have been leftist, even Marxist, but possibly not Leninist or Bolshevik. While the events of 1917 enabled the UPR, Lenin might have been an impediment to it.
  • Objection Some Lenin-statue-demolishing happened in Russia too (and maybe some by Russian nationalists/imperialists who would later vote for Putin), and it's possible that Lenin wouldn't have been as bothered by all the statue-demolishing—he seemed less vain than Stalin.
  • Objection Irrelevant. Ukraine is an internationally recognized sovereign country that was guaranteed sovereignty and territorial integrity by Russia via W:Budapest Memorandum in 1994, under no compulsion to do so. How Ukraine originated or what its inhabitants do to any monuments is completely beside the point.
• Argument for Ukraine was terrorizing the inhabitants of Donbass, and that must have been stopped.
  • Objection Donbas is part of Ukrainian territory. The military incursions in Donbas were in part caused by Russian covert support for the separatists. Ukraine has the right to defend its territory, even if it unfortunately leads to some loss of civilian life.
    • Objection Kosovo was a part of Yugoslavia territory, yet NATO has decided that Yugoslavia can't resolve its own issues by itself. The bombing of "independent country" was followed.
• Argument for NATO was expanding to the east far beyond promises made in the 1990ies, creating a risk to Russia's security. Russia must make sure Ukraine does not become part of NATO and remains a neutral buffer.
  • Objection NATO cannot easily take on a country that is a military superpower with a nuclear deterrent. Whatever the merit of the complaint above, the claim of serious military threat is implausible.
  • Objection Ukraine cannot become a NATO member any time soon. However, if Russia annexes the whole of Ukraine, there will be no buffer between Russia, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. Therefore, Russia, instead of protecting a buffer, acts to reduce it or eliminate it.
    • Objection The US could make a bilateral mutual defense treaty with UKraine outside of NATO. Other countries—say UK, Poland, and Romania—could make the teaty multilateral.
  • Objection What promises were made and from whom? What treaties were signed? Discussions? There might have been discussions of Russia itself joining NATO.
• Argument for Expanding on the above argument, there is a danger of a sudden strike against Russia from Ukraine. U.S. strategic planning documents contain the possibility of a preemptive strike against enemy missile systems, where the main enemy for the U.S. and NATO is Russia. In NATO documents, Russia is officially declared the main threat to North Atlantic security. Ukraine can serve as a springboard for the attack.
  • Objection NATO members Estonia and Latvia are rather close to St. Petersburg; Latvia is approximately as distant from Moscow as Ukraine. It follows that NATO does not need Ukraine to serve as a "springboard". Furthermore, Finland is rather close to St. Petersbug as well, and as a result of the operation, Finland has applied for NATO membership. Ukraine being more of a springboard than Estonia, Latvia and Finland is implausible. Moreover, deployment of NATO troops in Estonia and Latvia increased as a result of the operation. Rather than reducing the security risk to Russia, the operation increased it. And that it would happen was fairly easy to forsee: once Russia provides incontrovertible evidence of being an actual threat, then provided the assumption that NATO seeks excuses to take on Russia, NATO would use this "excuse" (which it is not) to boost its military presence in Estonia and Latvia. Thus, the above is implausible.
    • Objection Even so, adding Ukraine to NATO tightens the grip.
      • Objection See the distributed deterrent location argument below.
  • Objection That assumes that nearly all of the Russian nuclear deterrent is vulnerably located somewhere in western Russia, relatively close to Ukraine and NATO countries, rather than being spread throughout Russia to become much less vulnerable to disablement. A country that wants to make a solid nuclear deterrent will make sure to convince the enemy that the deterrent cannot be easily disabled, to dissuade it from first strike. And Russia is the largest country in the world by land mass, having ample opportunities to spread its nuclear deterrent across the territory. Indeed, some weapons are deployed in the Krasnoyarsk region of Siberia, about 3,000 km east of Moscow. Moreover, Russia has not only land-based ballistic missiles but also many submarine-based ballistic missiles and those air-launched from nuclear bombers. Russia's nuclear arsenal is largest in the world, with the close second place taken by the U.S., and the rest is small compared to the two giants. Therefore, the concern that Ukraine proximity presents anything like a threat to Russia's nuclear deterrent is very implausible.
    • Objection NATO could launch a conventional (non-nuclear) strike, assuming that Russia will not make a mutually suicidal nuclear counter-strike.
      • Objection That would be a high-risk gambit, given the Russian military doctrine is that strategic (high-impact) nuclear weapons can be used to defend the country.
        • Objection Perhaps not: if Russia is not suicidal, it could refuse to respond to conventional attack with strategic nuclear weapons. The official doctrine could be just a psychological part of the deterrent, with no real intention of being implemented. Therefore, a risk of conventional attack on Russia is still a concern, and a buildup of conventional weapons in a neighbor country is a problem.
          • Objection So the West should tolerate Russian annexation of parts—maybe all—of a non-NATO country so Russia would have a better chance of fighting NATO conventionally, because Russia really doesn't intend to use its vast nuclear capability—the most powerful in the world. Perhaps too, pretense of machismo notwithstanding, Putin doesn't have the heart/cold-bloodedness of his Soviet predecessors to use nukes (maybe they didn't either). This despite him having tighter control of the media of his country.
      • Objection Russia could still use tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional strike since these would be less likely to trigger a thermonuclear all-out war with the use of strategic nuclear weapons.

• Argument for NATO violated the sovereignty of Serbia in 1999 and does not have the right to criticize Russia now, or else it is hypocrisy.
  • Objection The argument above, rather than claiming that the Russian operation is justified, claims that it is as unjustified as NATO 1999 operation. Therefore, it does not support the motion.
  • Objection Ukraine wasn't "ethnically cleansing" Croats, Bosnians, nor Kosovars. Kosovo accounted for less than 12% the area and 22% the population of Serbia; Russia took about 1/5th of Ukraine. Kosovo declared independence 8 years after NATO's intervention; annexation of Crimea and parts of Donbas were in 2014, the year of the Russian invasion. The other 2 oblasts were taken in 2022, the year of Russia's bogus referendums there. They were all absorbed into Russia, or at least Russia is trying to absorb them. Kosovo hasn't been absorbed in to Albania or any other country, nor does it seem likely (at least not in the near-future). Moreover, one reason why Serbia doesn't recognize Russia's annexation of any of Ukraine might be that others might use the precedent against Serbia trying to retake Kosovo.
• Argument for NATO declares to be a defensive alliance yet its 1999 Serbia intervention shows it is not purely defensive one and cannot be trusted. See W:NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Thus, NATO is a real threat to be deflected.
  • Objection The idea that NATO is truly dangerous was disputed in some objections above.
  • Objection Assuming that Ukraine entry into NATO would create a real threat, Russia could declare that as soon as Ukraine applies for NATO membership, it will launch a war against Ukraine. That would create an international outrage, but would not destroy lives and infrastructure of Ukrainian civilians and would not cost the lives of Russian soldiers.
  • Objection NATO has not attacked any liberal democracies.
• Argument for After the US-sponsored 2014 anti-Russian coup (Victoria Nuland), Ukraine has become a US puppet state, a tool for US and Western interests. This was easy since Ukraine is a corrupt state, getting bad economically and socially after misguided Western guidance about privatization of formerly state-owned assets, leading to a creation of oligarch class who did not really deserve their riches. Zelensky is an American puppet. It is unacceptable for Russia to have a US puppet state in the direct vicinity, especially one that is engaging in increased armament since 2014. Ukraine is no genuine democracy.
  • Objection There may be some grain of truth in the above, while it seems to be far from a perfect undistorted truth. There are democratic elections in Ukraine and there is no way for the US to ensure that Zelensky gets elected, assuming that he has American connections. However, even if the above is accepted at face value for the sake of argument, it does not justify a military intervention by Russia. That is to say, a sovereign country being a puppet state of another is no justification for another country to launch a military attack on it. Thus, it would not be okay for the former West Germany to attack the former East Germany with the justification that it is a puppet state of the Soviet Union, or to attack any other of the Soviet puppet states. As for democracy, there are many non-democracies in the world, and being a non-democracy is alone no justification for an attack by another country, or else European democracies could just recolonize Africa with that justification. Furthermore, Ukraine has multiple political parties and free elections, being a semi-democracy at least. And the above claim does not justify missile attacks on civilian infrastructure anyway, nor does it justify annexation of parts of territory.
    • Objection It is not just any puppet state, it is a puppet state on Russian border and one engaging in armament.
      • Objection The Ukraine-armament argument was refuted above: Russia is a nuclear superpower next to none and its nuclear deterrent is in part 3,000 km east of Moscow.
  • Objection The evidence of a coup in 2014 is about as scant as Russia being a mere bystander of Ukrainian politics for the 10 years earlier (2004 (w:Viktor Yushchenko#TCDD poisoning) to 2014).
• Argument for Ukraine is developing biological weapons with the help of the US. Russia faces the risk of another COVID.
  • Objection A strong accusation like that requires strong evidence. Even if true, that would justify Russia to sent a protest memorandum to Ukraine to desist from that development, not to launch a military attack, including one on civilian infrastructure.
  • Objection What biological weapons, how would they be dispersed, and, could it affect Ukrainians and those of other countries? Evidence suggest the Covid-19 pandemic originated in China (i.e. PRC, "Red China")—be it a planned attack, experimental viruses accidentally getting out, or a "wet market" (i.e. carelessness, corrupt inspectors, and government-enforced opaqueness at least in the early days). In the early days of the pandemic, the leaders of Russia and Belarus were somewhat lackadaisical about its threat. (Trump arguably lost the US Presidency partially because his carelessness about the pandemic in the US, while Putin and Lukashenko maintain their presidencies.)
  • Objection If the US wanted biological weapons to be used against Russia, why would it need Ukraine's help? Further, if Ukraine is as corrupt as Russian apologists say, it could be a liability to US attempts at secrecy, hence an incentive to exclude Ukraine from such alleged research.
• Argument for The military operation is not to harm the Ukrainians but rather to liberate them from the criminal Kiev regime. Ukrainians are our [Russian's] comrades, those dearest to us – not only colleagues, friends and people who once served together, but also relatives, people bound by blood, by family ties.
  • Objection That would explain the indiscriminate bombing of civilian residential areas. The language is as if a direct quote from Orwell's 1984.
  • Objection If Russia is Ukraine's brother, Russia is a fratricidal one. (Btw, who is the elder brother?) Friends—i.e. real friends—don't murder each other. Li'l sister wants to be free (Emma Goldman and those in PR would agree). Who's more dear: Ukraine's well-being, or Putin's political successes? YT: this Russian kinda explains Ukraine's position in this song, beginning in the first few lines.
• Argument for Ukraine was a result of Lenin appeasing Ukrainian nationalists in 1921-1924, resulting in creation of Ukraine, formed as an arbitrary administrative unit, to which parts of Russian empire were transferred. Historically Russian population was transferred with these territories to those units. From the perspective of the historical destiny of Russia and its peoples, Lenin's principles of state development were worse than a mistake.
  • Objection Let us assume for the sake of the argument that the historical process of origination of Ukraine was problematic. But nearly all countries have problematic origination. Thus, the US was based on taking away the land from the native inhabitants, and Russia's vast territory was created by military conquest. Like it or not, countries historically originate by processes that depend on military power and powerful interests, not on justice. Kaliningrad belongs to Russia not based on neat historical process but rather based on Russia's victory in World War II. Carpathian Ruthenia was taken away from Czechoslovakia and given to the Soviet Union as a result of military and political power of the Soviet Union, not as a result of decent political development. Thus, we have to assume that political slicing of the Earth is a result of processes that we do not like. What we do want to achieve is to bring these processes to a halt, together with war. Since war is a key element by which that slicing originates and changes, and war is the thing that we want to avoid. As a result, an international order is created by which countries are not allowed to use war for territorial expansion or to amend real or imagined historical injustice. Thus, Germany is not allowed to remedy a perceived historical injustice by attacking Kalinigrad. It follows that any historical deliberations about real or imaginary flaws of origination of administrative units are irrelevant. Moreover, all these possible misgivings were known to Russia when it signed W:Budapest Memorandum in 1994, freely and without being compelled to do so. To wake up in 2022 and realize that Ukraine is in fact part of Russia and its process of origination is illegitimate is too late, unless one applies the ruthless principles by which countries often originate, the principle of ruthless force. some words from Palki Sharma Upadhyay (YT)(cued).
  • Objection The phrase "historical destiny" does not mean anything; it does not refer to any coherent concept. A historical destiny can be imagined to be whatever anyone wants. Thus, Napoleon can think it to be a France's historical destiny to rule Europe, and Hitler can think it is a Germany's historical destiny to do so.
• Argument for 1) While territorial integrity is important, it can be violated in rare well justified cases. 2) The principle of national self-determination is important. 3) Both principles were recognized by NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the following creation of Kosovo as a separate country, in violation of the law of Yugoslavia. The right of national self-determination was recognized in the creation of the successor countries of Austria-Hungary in 1918. 4) Ukraine, instead of recognizing the right of the Russians in the eastern Ukraine to self-determination and free choice in which country they want to live, took steps to bomb them in Donbass and cause loss of their lives and caused them to live in fear. This lasted for years. 5) Ukraine did not on its own organize a referendum in the eastern Ukraine to implement the right of self-determination. 6) As a result, Russia had the right to interfere with the territorial integrity of Ukraine to implement the right to self-determination for Russians living in Ukraine (via occupation followed by referendums) and to prevent further destruction of life and property in eastern Ukraine.
  • Objection The right to self-determination is problematic and not universally recognized, although it has some force, as per historical precedent and the creation of nation-states. Russia does not recognize the right of Chechnya to secession, and not even to increased autonomy, a contradiction.
    • Objection Russia may be contradicting itself, but that has no direct bearing on the abstract legitimacy of a military intervention to stop destruction of life and property in a territory that has been denied the right to self-determination.
      • Objection The point that the right to self-determination is problematic stands, regardless of the contradictory behavior on part of Russia and to a limited extent on part of NATO.
        • Objection The right to self-determination is manifested in the creation of Czechoslovakia from Austria, Slovakia from Czechoslovakia, Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, and Ireland from the Great Britain. The right is not universally accepted, but it has considerable force, and cannot be easily dismissed. It would be proper to recognize the right more broadly, and apply it e.g. to Catalonia. The right is recognized by the U.K. for Scotland to be able to hold a referendum on secession.
          • Objection The right to self-determination (secession) conflicts with the right to territorial integrity and sovereignty.
            • Objection It does, but what it means is that territorial integrity and sovereignty are not absolute goods and can be overridden by another concern. The above listed countries make it clear.
  • Objection Whether Kosovo should have been made a separate country is debatable, but the situation there was very different: Kosovans were fleeing Kosovo. The Kosovan situation was part of a larger Yugoslav inter-ethnic conflict that resulted in mass killings.
  • Objection Russia opposed the creation of Kosovo, despite Kosovan assembly voting for secession. Thus, Russia does not claim that Kosovo creation was a good or just thing. Yet Kosovo creation follows from the right to self-determination of regions within countries. A contradiction in the Russian position.
    • Objection There are contradictions in NATO positions.
      • Objection That opens NATO to valid criticism. However, it cannot serve as a justification of contradictions: if we accept contradictions as acceptable, we may give up the argumentation and logical inference game and yield to the Hegelian world of demagoguery, the Orwellian world of double-speak, etc.
        • Objection There are paraconsistent logics.
          •  Comment I give up here. Does anyone know how to refute this line of nonsense? Contradictions are unacceptable and to be avoided. People make mistakes and run into contradictions, but when they are called out on it, they have to accept it as a problem, not as a perfectly fine thing justified by paraconsistent logics and by the Hegelian pseudo-philosophy.
  • Objection The scale of destruction of life and property caused by the Russian 2022 operation far outstrips the scale of destruction in eastern Ukraine prior to that operation, and includes destruction of civilian residential targets in western Ukraine (e.g. Lviv), not even at the political center of the country but rather at the side of the country opposite to the location of nominal concern, Donbas. The attacks appear to be a terror of civilian populace across the country as an expression of anger, a felt offense or to force Ukraine (which would want to reduce loss of civilian life) to give up or negotiate conditions favorable to Russian campaign objectives. The purpose seems to be to put Ukrainian political leadership before a nasty dilemma: give up Ukraine to Russia to limit loss of life and property or retain self-respect by fighting an unjust military operation.
  • Objection Aside from bogus parodies by Putin's Ukrainian puppets, there was no legitimate referendum.
• Argument for Ukraine is infected by the virus of nationalism. That cannot be tolerated.
  •  Comment Putin speaks of "virus of nationalism" in reference to Ukraine, implying that nationalism is bad. Yet the invocation of the principle of national self-determination and pointing out that many of the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine are Russians is the invocation of the national principle. A contradiction. It is a comment, not a counterargument, since it was argued above that Putin contradicting himself has no direct bearing on abstract analysis of strength of arguments.
  • Objection The phrase "virus of nationalism" is a metaphor used to harm clear thought: it likens the Ukrainian desire to have a sovereign nation-state to an infectious disease, or even to a lethal disease, and it likens Russian politicians and the Russian army to medical doctors who are to cure the disease.
  • Objection Nationalism as manifested in Ukraine, Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania stands in contrast to imperialism. Thus, it is empires that object to nationalisms and want to keep nations within their fold. Russia is an empire in so far as it is a multi-national and multi-cultural country, where the leading nation is Russians. If Ukrainian "nationalism" as manifested in their desire to statehood is bad and the Russian empire is good, then Polish "nationalism" as manifested in their desire to statehood is also bad, and large portion of Poland should be part of Russian empire, as it once was (Ukraine also "once was" a part of Russia), and in fact, Slavic "nationalism" is bad, and instead of the "virus of nationalism" leading to creation and maintenance of separate Slavic countries, it would be ideal for them to join the great mother of all Slavic empires, Russia, which is already multi-national, which would help Russia to fulfill its "historical destiny", to use their phrase, a destiny that was already in part fulfilled by the eastern bloc of the Soviet Union, and which was dissolved in a great geopolitical tragedy. That would be only proper since it was Russia that saved these ungrateful Slavic countries from German imperialism; these ungrateful countries are now turning their back on Russia, destroying monuments and exhibiting Russophobia. Latvia and Lithuania should also come back to that fold. Right. Nothing like that is remotely acceptable.
  • Objection This "virus of nationalism" seems to affected Russia, their war against Ukraine being a symptom of it.
    • Objection Ukrainian nationalism causes harm to Russians living in Ukraine. Ukrainians are ethnically and culturally much closer to Russians than Poles.
      • Objection To put it more briefly, the verbal attack on "nationalism" is one on sovereignty of nation-states (countries) that were once part of an empire, here Russian empire. At a minimum, we only need to go back in history to see where the Russian empire once was, and see that the anti-nationalist rhetoric combined with historical analysis of which region was created how and how it was in fact part of Russia under the czar (relatively recently, actually), combined with the phrase "historical destiny", combined with complaints about the expansion of NATO eastwards, combined with a Russian 2021 request that NATO moves back westward, combined with the complaints about Polish ingratitude, all point to a restoration of the Russian empire as a good and just thing to do. Indeed, NATO expansion does not endanger Russia but it does endanger a restoration of the Russian empire as it once was. The above longer analysis objected to is sustained. (It is something like this analysis that inspires fears in Europe and the great international help and encouragement that Ukraine receives.)
      • Objection If Ukrainians are ethnically and culturally much closer to Russians than Poles, then there is less reason for Russians—or perhaps more aptly, Ukrainian Russophones—to fear assimilation into Ukrainian culture as they will still not be like Poles.

Arguments against

• Argument against Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange of guarantee of sovereignty and territorial integrity. One of the guarantors was Russia. The violation of the guarantee is unjustified and bad, creating an international incentive for countries not to participate in disarmament in good faith for the fear that the agreements will not be honored.
• Argument against Ukraine is a sovereign country that does not have the military power to threaten Russia, and was peaceful before the Russian 2022 military operation. No nuclear weapons were being developed by Ukraine.
• Argument against Ukraine is a sovereign country and as such has the right to choose its military alliances.
• Argument against Whatever the complaints about the Ukrainian government, the civilians targeted by Russian missiles, including those in west Ukraine, did not do any harm to Russia, did not plan any harm, did not have any means to do harm, and are not a legitimate military target, unlike possible Ukrainian troops and military installations. The scale of destruction of civilian infrastructure is completely unjustified even if one accepts some merits in the operation for the sake of the argument. Whatever the merits, the manner of conduct of the operation is unjustified and constitutes war crimes and crimes against humanity.
• Argument against The claim of Nazism, while not 100% without merit, is overblown and implausible on the whole. Jews are not being persecuted in Ukraine, nor are LGBT+s (at least the Pride events in Kyiv 2019 went better than those in Moscow 2019). Russians were treated not perfectly nicely in so far as the use of Russian language was treated in part as problematic, but were not subject to systematic harm, discrimination (e.g. rejection for public office) or elimination—indeed, Zelenskyy is a Russophone. The Nazi incidents were real but low-frequency and low-impact, nowhere close to being on a scale to justify foreign intervention. One case was 2014 Odessa incident where more than 30 pro-Russian people were killed. Not only was this an isolated incident but it took part in 2014, and similar incidents would have to continue to justify a corrective intervention in 2022, or else there is no ongoing phenomenon that needs intervention.
•  Comment Part of Russia's motivation is probably territorial expansion, achieving a unity with what many Russians perceive to be part of the Russian nation. This is suggested by Putin's 2021 text On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. It is reinforced by the attempted annexation of parts of eastern Ukraine by Russia.
•  Comment There are significant natural resources in western Ukraine and around Crimea. These present an objective interest of any country: natural resources are some of the most valuable resources in existence, and subject to wars. It is reinforced by the attempted annexation of parts of eastern Ukraine by Russia.
•  Comment Before political changes in 2014, Ukraine was on the course of becoming more integrated with Russia. The change of the course, in which Ukraine turned away from Russia and toward West, is likely to have created a disappointment in Russian political circles. One of the manifestations of that disappointment was the annexation of Crimea.
•  Comment The operation is not only unjustified as per the arguments above but also extremely reckless, increasing a risk of nuclear exchange. Two nuclear superpowers are participating on the war, Russia directly and the United States in the weapon supplier capacity. If Russia starts losing the conventional war, this may create an incentive for it to use a tactical nuclear weapon to prevent the appearance of a loser, and this could be incentive for NATO to respond militarily, which could lead to further spiraling escalation. Russia knew about this dynamics from the start since it was their claim that it was a proxy war between NATO and Russia. The situation created by Russia is volatile and highly disconcerting.

See also

• Is aggressive war of territorial expansion good?

Further reading

• W:2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
• W:Legality of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
• Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault, 2014, mearsheimer.com
• Why John Mearsheimer Gets Ukraine Wrong, 2022, newideal.aynrand.org
• How to justify a war: Putin's arguments for invading Ukraine, english.elpais.com
• Article by Vladimir Putin "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" • President of Russia, July 12, 2021, en.kremlin.ru
• Address by the President of the Russian Federation, February 21, 2022, en.kremlin.ru
• Why did Russia invade Ukraine and has Putin's war failed?, bbc.com
• Is there any justification for Putin's war?, 2022, theguardian.com
• Vladimir Putin points to history to justify his Ukraine invasion, regardless of reality, March 7, 2022, theconversation.com
• Russia's War on Ukraine: Six Months of Lies, Implemented, state.gov
• Extracts from Putin's speech on Ukraine, February 21, 2022, reuters.com
• Ukraine clashes: dozens dead after Odessa building fire, 2014, theguardian.com
• Inside Russia's Nuclear Complex - Structure Of Nuclear Facilities In Russia, pbs.org
• Vladimir Putin: Restoration of empire is the endgame for Russia's president, 2022, cnn.com
• Ukraine war: Could Russia use tactical nuclear weapons?, 2022, bbc.com
• Can Russia's War in Ukraine End Without Nuclear Weapons?, carnegieendowment.org
• Is the war in Ukraine a proxy conflict? | King's College London, kcl.ac.uk
• Wikisource: Category:2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine