Cicero/Quotes from Cicero's de Amicitia

Written in 44 B.C. by my greatest friend, in his time and mine. The Latin quotes are selected for beauty [bea], language [lan], and interest [int] and are translated into English. The page numbers (all even) and line numbers are from the Loeb edition. All translations are the original work of Gus Wiseman (Nafindix), with the exception of any contributions from other users. The public domain sources of the Latin quotes are:

• Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, vol. XX, 1923; Latin text with facing English translation by William Armistead Falconer.
• Marcus Tullius Cicero, Laelius de amicitia, https://www.forumromanum.org/literature/cicero/amic.html , ed. C.F.W. Müller, Leipzig: Teubner, 1884.

I.5.0 page 112 [bea]

"Sed ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia."

As I, an old man myself, then wrote to an old man about old age, in this book I have written to a friend, indeed my greatest [Atticus], about friendship.

II.6.0 page 112 [bea]

"Nec enim melior vir fuit Africano quisquam nec clarior."

There was no better man than Africanus, nor more distinguished.

IV.15.0 page 124 [lan/bea]

"Quam ob rem cum illo quidem, ut supra dixi, actum optime est, mecum incommodius, quem fuerat aequius, ut prius introieram, sic prius exire de vita."

With him at least, as I said before, the event happened very well; for me less so, who, having entered life before him, ought to have left it in the same order.

IV.15.10 page 124 [lan]

"Itaque non tam ista me sapientiae, quam modo Fannius commemoravit, fama delectat, falsa praesertim, quam quod amicitiae nostrae memoriam spero sempiternam fore, idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod ex omnibus saeculis vix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum; quo in genere sperare videor Scipionis et Laeli amicitiam notam posteritati fore."

It is not so much for wisdom, as Fannius just mentioned, that my reputation pleases me (especially undeserved), but because I hope the memory of our friendship will be eternal. This is all the more at heart because, in all history, scarcely three or four pairs of friends are mentioned, and I would like to see the friendship of Scipio and Laelius so marked for posterity.

V.17.6 page 126 [int/bea]

"Quam ob rem, quae disputari de amicitia possunt, ab eis censeo petatis, qui ista profitentur; ego vos hortari tantum possum, ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas."

For an exhaustive discussion of friendship, you ought to inquire of the Greek philosophers and rhetoricians. For myself, I can only exhort you to put friendship before everything else, as nothing is so natural and adaptable to human affairs, favorable or adverse.

VI.20.6 page 130 [int/bea]

"Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio; qua quidem haud scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis inmortalibus datum."

Friendship is merely an agreement on all things, human and divine, together with mutual goodwill and affection; with the possible exception of wisdom, I can hardly imagine a greater gift from the immortal gods to man.

VI.20.10 page 130 [int]

"Divitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates."

Some prefer wealth, others good health, others power, others political office, many also physical pleasures.

VI.22.3 page 130 [bea]

"Quid dulcius quam habere, quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum?"

What is finer than to have one with whom you venture to say all things as with yourself?

VI.22.8 page 132 [lan]

"Denique ceterae res, quae expetuntur, opportunae sunt singulae rebus fere singulis, divitiae, ut utare, opes, ut colare, honores, ut laudere, voluptates, ut gaudeas, valetudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis; amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris, praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiva, numquam molesta est; itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, locis pluribus utimur quam amicitia."

Other objectives mostly accord to individual purposes; wealth, for buying; power, to cultivate; public office, for distinction; pleasure, to share; health, to be free from suffering and retain the capabilities of the body; but friendship, standing out wherever you turn, excluded from nowhere, never untimely, never tiresome, attends to many things. Indeed, not even water and fire, as they say, are used in more places than friendship.

VII.23.14 page 134 [int/bea]

"Quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis et discidiis funditus possit everti?"

What home is so steadfast, what state so well-founded, that it cannot be utterly overthrown by intolerance and division?

VIII.26.4 page 136 [lan]

"Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa."

Usually when deliberating on the subject it seems to me most essential to consider whether friendship is sought out of weakness and poverty, its essence being in the giving and taking of whatever favors each man needs from another, or if there is another cause, older and more beautiful, and more from nature herself.

VIII.27.0 page 138 [int/lan]

"Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione, quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura."

Friendship seems to me to arise more from nature than from need, and from attachment of the soul in a certain attraction, not only after deliberating how useful a relationship would be.

VIII.28.0 page 130 [int]

"Nihil est enim virtute amabilius, nihil quod magis alliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem etiam eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus."

Nothing is more lovable than virtue, nothing less enticing to affection, for we cherish men of virtue and probity, even those whom we have never seen.

IX.30.4 142 [int]

"Africanus indigens mei? Minime hercule! ac ne ego quidem illius; sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse non nulla, quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit; auxit benevolentiam consuetudo."

What did Africanus need from me? Nothing, by Hercules! Nor I from him. In a certain admiration for his virtue, I liked him, while he, in some good opinion, perhaps, of my character, liked me; and our close familiarity bred goodwill.

IX.32.4 page 142 [int/lan/bea]

"Quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus, ipsi autem intellegamus natura gigni sensum diligendi et benevolentiae caritatem facta significatione probitatis. Quam qui appetiverunt, applicant se et propius admovent, ut et usu eius, quem diligere coeperunt, fruantur et moribus sintque pares in amore et aequales propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposcendum, atque haec inter eos sit honesta certatio."

So let us remove these critics from our discussion and know for ourselves that nature, upon a signal of probity, gives birth to a sense of moral attraction and goodwill, to which one who moves nearer profits of favors and customs and healthy competition, becoming more equal and more worthy of goodwill deserved than demanded.

X.33.4 page 144 [lan]

"Quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat, quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae diem permanere."

Scipio: Nothing is more difficult than for friendship to last all the way to the final day of life.

X.34.3 page 144 [int/lan]

"Quodsi qui longius in amicitia provecti essent, tamen saepe labefactari, si in honoris contentionem incidissent; pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiis quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae; ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstitisse."

Scipio: Long-time friends are often pried apart if they should fall into contention for political office; for there is no greater harm to friendship than greed for money, present in normal men, or the aspiration for reputation and glory among the best of us, in which the greatest enemies have often arisen from the greatest friends.

X.35.0 page 146 [int]

"Magna etiam discidia et plerumque iusta nasci, cum aliquid ab amicis, quod rectum non esset, postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent ad iniuriam; quod qui recusarent, quamvis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab iis, quibus obsequi nollent."

Grave disagreement, though usually justifiable, arises when friends are demanded to do something wrong, such as becoming accomplices in lust or abettors of harm. However ethically this demand is refused, yet they will argue that their right of friendship was disregarded by the disobedient friend.

XI.37.18 page 148 [int]

"Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris; nam cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris."

It is no excuse that you did wrong for a friend; for since recognition of virtue is the origin of all friendships, if you have lost faith in virtue, friends are hard to keep.

XIII.44.0 page 154 [int/lan]

"Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem, dum rogemur; studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit; consilium vero dare audeamus libere. Plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur."

Let this be sanctioned the first law of friendship: ask friends for honorable favors, do honorable things for them, and do not even wait to be asked. Always be devoted and unhesitating, and dare to give honest counsel freely; finally, let the authority of well-advising friends be the strongest, and let it be effective when used for warning, not only candidly, but also, if the situation calls for it, sternly.

XIII.45.0 page 156 [int/lan/bea]

"Nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quaedam (sed nihil est, quod illi non persequantur argutiis): partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum, alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas, cum velis, vel remittas; caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem, qua frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus."

I hear that the following, amazingly, are in part attested by certain men considered wise in Greece (but there is nothing they would not pursue with their sophistry): excessive friendships should be avoided, lest one must be anxious for many; one's own affairs are more than enough, and it is annoying to be too much implicated in the affairs of others; it is most convenient to hold loosely the reins of friendship, that we may tighten and loosen them whenever we wish; freedom from care is essential to happiness, which the soul could not enjoy, if, as it were, one were in labor for many.

XIII.47.5 page 158 [bea]

"Neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere."

It is inconsistent either not to undertake something, or to abandon it once begun, in order to avoid anxiety.

XIV.51.9 page 162 [lan]

"Atque haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis."

I think it may even be a burden never to lack anything from friends.

XIV.51.13 page 162 [bea]

"Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est."

Friendship does not follow usefulness, but usefulness follows friendship.

XV.53.4 page 164 [int]

"Quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt exulantem, tum se intellexisse, quos fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, cum iam neutris gratiam referre posset."

They say that Tarquin, as he was going into exile, said, "Now I understand what loyal friends I had, and what disloyal, now that I can reward or punish neither."

XVI.59.3 page 168 [int]

"Non est igitur amici talem esse in eum, qualis ille in se est, sed potius eniti et efficere, ut amici iacentem animum excitet inducatque in spem cogitationemque meliorem."

Here it is not a friend's duty to be to his friend as his friend is to himself, but rather to bring hope to his fallen soul and guide him to better thinking.

XVII.61.0 page 170 [lan]

"His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut, etiam si qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur; est enim, quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit."

When the characters of friends are blameless, then between them should be harmony of all things with no exceptions, including opinions and intentions, so that even if by chance the intentions of a friend are less than honorable and need to be supported in a matter of his life or reputation, we should veer from the road, as long as the greatest turpitude should not follow; for there is a limit to what pardon can be given to a friend.

XVII.63.0 page 172 [lan]

"Est igitur prudentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benevolentiae, quo utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia ex aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum."

It is thus for the wise to check, as if driving a chariot, the assault of goodwill, which we should manage, in part, by putting the dispositions of friends, as we do with horses, to a preliminary test.

XVII.64.6 page 174 [bea]

"Quamquam Ennius recte: Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur; tamen haec duo levitatis et infirmitatis plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt aut in malis deserunt."

Ennius said rightly that a certain friend is discerned in uncertain circumstances; indeed, by levity and weakness most are unmasked: for when they are doing well they forget their friend, and when their friend is doing poorly they desert him.

XVIII.65.0 page 174 [lan]

"Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est; eius, quem in amicitia quaerimus, fides; nihil est enim stabile, quod infidum est."

Loyalty is the foundation of stability and perseverance in friendship; for nothing is stable that is disloyal.

XVIII.65.16 page 176 [int/lan]

"...aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam..."

It is more noble to be openly resentful than to hide behind a lying face.

XVIII.66.0 page 176 [int/bea]

"Accedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae. Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior."

To this should be added a certain sweetness of words and customs, no minor constituent in friendship. For while seriousness and gravity in all things is indeed impressive, yet friendship should be more genial, agreeable, and pleasant, and more inclined to every good-natured courtesy.

XX.71.0 page 180 [int]

"Ut igitur ii, qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctionisque necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent, sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari."

As in a bond of friendship and familiarity we should equalize ourselves to those who are inferior, they in turn should not resent being surpassed by us in intellect, fortune, or position.

XX.72.2 page 180 [int]

"Sunt enim quidam, qui molestas amicitias faciunt, cum ipsi se contemni putant; quod non fere contingit nisi iis, qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur; qui hac opinione non modo verbis, sed etiam opere levandi sunt."

There are those who bear friendship with resentment by thinking they are looked down upon, which is rarely true unless they see themselves in the same way, and this misperception should be relieved with words and even actions.

XXIII.87.8 page 194 [int]

"Atque hoc maxime iudicaretur, si quid tale posset contingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum, quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet. Quis tam esset ferreus, qui eam vitam ferre posset, cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo?"

If it were able to happen that some god were to lift us from this crowd of men and relocate us to a solitary place, there suppling all things our nature desires in copious abundance, while yet stealing our power to know any other person, who would be so made of iron as to be able to bear that life, and whom would loneliness not deprive of all enjoyment?

XXIII.88.0 page 194 [lan/int]

"Verum ergo illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi ab aliis senibus auditum: 'si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore; quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui narraret, habuisset.'"

The words of Archytas of Tarentum are true, as I often heard our elders (who learned it from their own elders) recounting: "If somebody ascended to the sky and beheld the nature of the world and the beauty of the stars, even that sight would be disappointing, which would have been most pleasing, if only he had had someone with whom he could share it."

XXIV.88.13 page 196 [bea]

"Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae, multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur, quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est; una illa subeunda offensio est, ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt."

The various purposes of friendship are manyfold, affording many opportunities for suspicion or offense, some of which a wise friend should avoid, some he should make light of, some he should endure; but it is often necessary to the maintenance of a friendship that a friend should be warned or reproached, and this should be accepted genially when offered in good faith.

XXIV.89.4 page 196 [int]

"Molesta veritas, siquidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae, sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit; maxima autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio inpellitur."

Truth is annoying, if indeed hatred arises from it, which is venom to friendship, but deference is much more troubling; for indulging a friend's wrong-doing allows him to be carried off precipitously. But the greatest fault lies in him who both despises truth and is driven to fraud by our complaisance.

XXIV.90.2 page 198 [lan]

"Scitum est enim illud Catonis ut multa: 'melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri quam eos amicos, qui dulces videantur; illos verum saepe dicere, hos numquam.'"

Among many known sayings of Cato is that some men are better served by their bitterest enemies than by their sweet-seeming friends, for the former often speak the truth, the latter never.

XXV.95.0 page 200 [bea]

"Secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris."

By putting in the work, the fawning friend, like all things painted and pretended, can be known and separated from the true.

XXVI.97.10 page 202 [bea]

"Ita fit, ut is adsentatoribus patefaciat aures suas maxime, qui ipse sibi adsentetur et se maxime ipse delectet."

So it happens that he who most of all opens his ears to flatterers in turn flatters and gratifies himself most of all.

XXVII.103.0 page 208 [bea]

"Equidem ex omnibus rebus, quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo, quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare."

Among all the things fortune or nature has given me, I have nothing to compare to the friendship of Scipio.