A Psychoanalytic Discourse of the Web and AI

Tolga Theo Yalur, PhD
Cognitive Philosopher. Psychoanalyσto Library
theoyalur@gmail.com

In psychoanalytic theory, discourses construct the subject in the reality, the social other, the invisible whole, which, in its complete form, reproduces itself whenever the subject speaks as. In Jacques Lacan's (1972) view, this intersubjectivity is structured upon the function of the self where the specular report to the Other in narcissism is pressing. Sigmund Freud (1920) pointed to the question of the indestructibility of the unconscious desire to mark its essential character in reiteration and reproduction that cause the unrest in civilization. Freud was not walking down a spiritualist path but questioning the structure of discursive determining the subject in social reality. This book advances the psychoanalytic notion of discourse to rationalize the subject on the web of reality. Psychoanalytic theory answers questions of reality in various networks that Freud revealed and Lacan methodized, where he conceptualized the subject of reality in discourses. What I term as "the informative discourse" has the symbolizing mechanism to register, diagnose, detect, decode the patterns or patternize the subject’s information for desire, need and consumption behaviors that is called objet(a) in psychoanalysis. The subject depends upon the information he/she creates or the subject is conditioned by the prescribed information, which is what the discourse contextually might store in databases to make sense of the subject’s desire, need and various behaviors.

Object of Discourses

In psychoanalytic theory, the coherence of reality is in question. Lacan's conception of reality is triple: the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary, which are three different senses. The triple unity of Reality in Lacan’s oeuvre is based upon the sign, more or less demonstrating the equivalence of these units in a hole that is the symptom (Lacan 1936, 1953, 1967). The Real is what is strictly unthinkable, what would at least be a departure, what would make a hole in the register of the Symbolic. And it would make it possible to question what the real is about the triple reality that conveys a sense. This sense is there only to be lessened to the function that supports the unconscious, the function that is structured as language. The equivocation of this function is symbolic, not sense. Sense is other than the symbolic and support the Imaginary, everything that is represented for the human being who cannot grasp the whole, such as the psychosomatic wholeness, but instead needs reflexive objects to get a glimpse at the bodily unity, mastery over the human as psychosomatic being.

The human being conceives reality because of being in the illusion of it. Psychoanalytic theory conceives the human reality in these essential registers to answer questions of the unconceived (the real) and the singular experience (imaginary) that report the subject through speech (the symbol). The subject's registration into reality is the step toward a primordial question in terms of the trespass from the conscious to the unconscious. To diagnose what happens in the Real in the symptom:"Symbolism is through which the symptom returns in language. As Freud manifested as the essential reality, there are symptoms, missed acts, inscriptions. These are symbols that are even specifically organized in language, functioning from an equivalent of the signifier and the signified: the very structure of language" (Lacan, 1953). The experience, the essence of psychoanalytic speech is the trespass of the forces that give balance to being human: the objet (a). The symbol of the objet (a) is “the object there”. When the object is no longer there, it is incarnated in duration, devoid of self. By the same token, the object is there for the subject S, all the while. Here is the report of the symbol to the fact that all that is human is considered as such. The Real manifests itself not only in the analytic experience if the notion of symptom was introduced. Long before Freud, Marx made it the sign of something that is what is wrong, in the Real.

Marx was able to work on the symptom as long as the symptom was the affect of the Symbolic in the Real, reflected in the Imaginary, making up a hole. As long as the unconscious says everything that responds to the symptom. The unconscious is responsible for reducing the symptom to the symbolic register, which is everything that makes sense in words in the human consciousness and the unconscious, by means of human imaginary reports to others to enter into the symbolic order of reality as subject.

"The symptom is not the novelty of Freud’s introduction to psychoanalysis but Marx’s. Marx's capitalist discourse, inasmuch as it is the determination of the master’s discourse, discovers the fact of the symptom. Capitalism departing from the master’s discourse is what seems to distinguish the political outcomes from the Marxist critique of the discourse of semblance. If there is something revolutionary in Freud, though the word “revolutionary” might be misused, it is the fact that he prioritized one function which is the function in common with Marx: it is to consider a number of facts as symptoms. The dimension of the symptom is that it speaks, even to those who do not know how to hear it. The symptom also does not say everything to those who know how to hear it." (Lacan, 1971)

Karl Marx's theory is the theory of capitalist discourse and the symptom of this discourse is the power of the poor, the proletariat. "For they do not know what they do," is the quote from Marx to diagnose the fact that the poor does not know, nor does the poor own the means of production that is held by the upper classes to determine the reality, but nonetheless the poor does the work of reproducing not only capitalism as the economic system but also the social reality, for which, Marx adopted the term "false consciousness". "The dimension of the symptom is that it speaks, even to those who do not know how to hear it," said Lacan for Marx's discovery of it: "The symptom does not say everything to those who know how to hear it. This dimension of the symptom is the turning point in a regis‐ter that has been resonating around the theme of cognition. The theory of cognition explains the register to constitute the formulations of science, for which the physics formulates regressions. With the evolution of science, the human is in the condition of being on the path to some verity, which demonstrates a heterogeneity of the double register. Except that in my teaching, the coherence of this register is in question." (Lacan, 1971). Lacan's rework on reality is based upon the context of the psychoanalytic discourse where the analysand speaks and the analyst keeps silent most of the time, and obviously the psychoanalytic discourse is not only personal but political as well. As I unpack, Lacan had to compare his work with Marx', and the psychoanalytic subject with the worker.

"Speech" is the psychoanalytic specialization that led Lacan to formulate the "discourse". Discours is the term for "speech" in French but psychoanalytically means more than that. When the analysand speaks, it is with signs, symbols, the level of interpretation for the analyst. The cognitive, conscious and unconscious functions of speech is the discourse in psychoanalytic theory. The Other (L'Autre, A), the symbolic speaks in the form of the unconscious word. This “speech” is discursive, banned and censored, distorted, stopped, captured, profoundly ignored for the subject by the interposition of the imaginary report of the object (a) to another object, of the self to the other. The essentially alienated report of the subject to the symbolic in the discourse, the Big Other. Would the discourse of the subject be coherent in the Other, the symbolism where all the discourses settle? In the realm of the Other, a fully consistent discourse is not possible.

The function of the objet(a) responds to the coherence of the verity nowhere but in the Other. The objet(a) indicates well that the affect of the meaning of something that claims to symbolize lack, cannot be a signifier. The psychoanalytic discourse expresses this lack in the symbolizer with S(A) in terms of “Che vuoi?”. The “Che?” means: what does the Other (A) want? I demand. Nothing can be expressed in terms of the function of the subject of lack except to double it because the discourse does not question it. This duplicity of the report to the Other duplicates what is represented as the discourse, the speech of what is represented as a demand. To formulate, the subject S is put in a conjunction with the hallmark ◊ and demand D, articulated as such, S ◊ D. The function of s(A) is what happens to the subject’s affect in speech. The description of the subject begins in the scale of what represents one signifier for another signifier. The Other's desire is the spring of imaginary identification, expressed in a symbolic mode which intersects with the imaginary.

Lacan uses formulae to inscribe the report of the subject to the symbolic register of reality, the Other, the loci of the Subject (S) in the symbolic. These are discourses that are mostly based upon Lacan’s discoveries and formulations as the psychoanalyst who both teaches and philosophizes the psychoanalytic theory. In Lacan’s practice, what is constituted in the analysis is the virtual discursive report. In psychoanalytic discourse, the objet(a) is the matter that goes around affectively, exceeding the extent of the human mind to the symbolic.

What is essential is the symbolizer S1 in the formulae, in the structure of mathematical logic of the discourse. The structure is something that first presents itself as a group of factors, forming a co-variant whole. S1 needs to have the discourse function with language. To conceive the efficiency of language in determining the subject through these discourses as varieties of the master’s discourse, Lacan deploys the semblance, the verity, Other, product. What the factors of language produce is the surplus of jouissance, informed in the use of S1. The capitalist discourse is untenable and inclined to crises more than other discourses. The capitalist discourse is the substitute for the master’s discourse, and if there has been a crisis, that’s the crisis of the capitalist discourse. The very small inversion between the S1 and the S, the subject. Because it works too fast to be consumed, however, there is virtually no chance that anything serious will happen in the course of the analytical discourse, apart from being random. The function of discourse supports itself with four privileged places, one of which remains unnamed: the semblance. The master signifier (S1) replaces the master’s discourse, knowledge (S2) might occupy it in the university discourse, the split subject (S) might be there in the hysteric’s discourse, surplus-jouissance (a) in the psychoanalytic discourse.

Discourses in the Psychoanalytic Theory

In the University Discourse, where is the S in the scholar conditioned at the scientific production level. The direction of the arrow means that the report does not come from anywhere, it was produced at the scientific stage of the discursive mechanism. In the University Discourse, knowledge (S2) is the verity subjecting the master symbolizer (S1). In the Hysteric's Discourse, the teacher is situated as the master. In the Psychoanalytic Discourse, the analyst leads and has to keep in place what it is about the function of the object a. The psychoanalyst supports the function until the other recognizes it. In the formulae, the structure of the Psychoanalytic Discourse is the opposite of the Master’s Discourse. At the level of the master's discourse, the master introduces One to the world, and commands S2. To obey is to know. In Hegel’s dialectic, the slave knows.

Surplus-jouissance

Marx taught the capitalist discourse to describe the surplus value that's equivalent to the surplus-jouissance in psychoanalytic theory. The surplus-value is what makes capitalism work. These similar terms do not have the same sense. The function of language is in question there. Who does the work in language is Marx. He is the analyzer, not the analysand. If Marx is questioned in terms of the work of language, the term surplus-value in language could’ve turned into the surplus-jouissance in psychoanalysis. His capitalist discourse relies heavily on technological advances, a contradicting, complex and evolutionary mode of production whose survival is based upon the exploitation of alienated labor and crises. Marx’s innovation is this function in which he situates labor. He did not discover labor for sure, but he conceptualized a labor theory of value to demonstrate the surplus-value.

"A subject is what can be represented by one signifier for another signifier," is Lacan's motto passim. Psychoanalytic discourse demonstrates how the surplus jouissance is represented by the enunciation, as an affect by the very discourse. In the discourse on the function of the renunciation of jouissance that the term of the objet(a) is introduced. There is the function within the function of renunciation, that is, renunciation, through the affect in the psychoanalytic discourse, decides the degree of surplus-jouissance that situates the objet(a). The objet(a) is the essential object of the function of the surplus-jouissance. In the psychoanalytic jargon, the excess of jouissance is loss for the subject of discourse who is far from being sufficient.

"The subject is no longer identical to oneself, and hence is lost without joy, which is 'surplus-jouissance'. The loss is strictly connected to the entry into the discursive play of symbolisms representing everything as thought. The subject is quite unable to name the symptom around this loss, the surplus-jouissance. Freud's theory of repetition designates this: Nothing is identifiable in the jouissance. In virtue of the sign, something else replaces the object; the trait that marks it. Nothing can happen there without an object being lost." (Lacan, 1968)

The formula S ◊ a demonstrates this well. What happens to the ratio of one signifier S1 to another signifier S2 is that the subject S, represented by S1, is not sufficient since any signifier is connected to only another objet(a). The formula depicts the ratio of the reiteration of the signifier S in S1 → S2 in the discursive diagrams, representing the subject in relation to himself/herself, leading to the (a). There happens something that is neither the subject nor the object, but S ◊ a. From there onwards the other signifiers represent in the ratio S1 → S2 that introduces the metonymy as the condition of the subject’s being.

Lacan connects his motto to the Marxian notion of "commodity" in the capitalist discourse through the compatibility of the surplus jouissance with the surplus value detected in the capitalist discourse. What Marx deciphered as the economic reality of the exchange value is represented by the use value. The difference of these two incompatible values yields the surplus value. Like the free markets where some object of human work is described as a commodity, incorporating something of the surplus value, the surplus-jouissance is what allows the isolation of the function of the objet(a).

Jouissance is the substance of everything in psychoanalysis. Its scope introduces the function of surplus jouissance, in Marx’s terms, the surplus value. Lacan attributes the invention of surplus-jouissance to Marx, if not discovery. In this terminological report is the function of the objet(a). This objet(a) is what Marx's discourse invents as the surplus value. The same goes for the surplus-value before it appeared in Marx’s discourse in its rigour. Eventually, what is revealed after these discoveries is the affect of the discourse. The objet(a) is the affect of the psychoanalytic discourse. Is it an artifice created by the psychoanalytic discourse? The question of the artifice is modified and suspended, which discovers its mediation in the fact that what is discovered in the discourse’s affect has already appeared as the affect in the psychoanalytic experience as a symptom, a turning point described by the objet(a).

Labor was not a new notion in Marx's introduction of objet(a) in commodification, nor was the renunciation of jouissance. The meaning of labor and jouissance are similar, but revealing the renunciation is the essence of the psychoanalytic discourse. The function of surplus-jouissance depicts this essence and demonstrates an affect of the discourse in the renunciation of jouissance. Labor market totalizes merits and values, organization of choices, preferences in the domain of the Other. This is what refers to an ordinal, even cardinal structure. In the field of the Other, the discursive symbolism detains the subject's means to enjoy. Marx conceived the capitalist markets in the field of the Other, asking to obey and consume, and then do it again. In Lacan's "A subject is what can be represented by one signifier for another signifier," the subject is asked in the capitalist discourse by the Other to buy this or that for the illusion of being an adequate subject through consumption objects (a) that are replete with the excess of meanings and symbols from logos to language for the subject to perform beyond the needs but for the jouissance of illusory being the almighty S, which is the 'false consciousness' Marx termed and Lacan deciphered as 'misrecognition', both of which refers to the alienated subject.

"For Marx, the surplus value, as the surplus-jouissance in analytic discourse, restitutes the capitalist discourse, which cannot be appeased by a metalanguage. The surplus value is the cause of the desire that an economy makes its principle: that of extensive production, therefore the insatiable lack-to-enjoy. The surplus value is accumulated to increase the means of production in the name of capital. It extends consumption, otherwise this production would be in vain, precisely from its ineptitude to procure a jouissance. Master’s discourse gives meaning to the term 'surplus-jouissance' in the psychoanalytic discourse, which is equivalent to the surplus value, an essential spring in Marx’s capitalist discourse. The capitalist discourse is not the master’s discourse as such, but a variety of it." (Lacan, 1972)

For Lacan, language is what produces the surplus jouissance, and the term that applies to this jouissance is the cause of desire: objet a. That objet a as a term is the true support of everything functional in selecting each object in desire. In psychoanalytic theory, objet(a) concerns the essence of the subject. The object cause of desire is what represents the subject for another signifier, another structure. Discourse is the order of language that happens through language and functions as a social connection. Marx's subject is in the place of the objet(a), the loci of the essential function of market capitalism. Freud tracked the discontent that inflects the implacable capitalist discourse. He did it down to the unconscious where something is working. The capitalist discourse, in complementing itself with the ideology of the class struggle, only induces the exploited to compete on the exploitation of principle.

Informative Discourse

Jacques Lacan's notion of discourse works well to rationalize the psychoanalytic subject on the web. Lacan’s method answers the question of reality in various networks. What could be termed as the informative discourse has the symbolic mechanism to register, diagnose, detect, decode the patters or patternize the subject’s information (S1) for desire, need and consumption behaviors, objet(a). The user is the Subject S who depends upon the information he/she creates on the web, the S1. S1 is what the informative discourse contextually might store in databases (S2) to make sense of the subject’s desire, need and consumption behaviors, objet(a). The S is discursively (S1) connected to the S2 through the object report (a). The difference is that there is no master in the informative discourse, which makes the whole web sound like the hysteric’s discourse.

There is no obvious master in the informative discourse but sets of logics that could make verities concerning the subject information. S2, unlike Lacan’s former discourses, does not stand for a One mastery in the discourse, but the symbolic as the Other that varies a lot in the web. In other words, there is no universal discourse on the internet but small incompatible varieties of knowledge that claim to offer and represent what is true and what is real. To make things easier, I would conceptualize S2 as such. The S, through the S1, reports to the a, that is tailored by S2 for S where the subject’s desires and needs might be influenced, triggered, in brief, affected by and large, a term Lacan also makes sense of in his lectures and discourses. S has in no way an access to the S2, deprived of the means of making verities and confronted with, and represented by, small objects of desire and needs instead.

Sigmund Freud discusses the question of affect in his description of the unheimlich, the uncanny, the feeling of otherness that differs from the most common, the most ordinary, the most familiar appearances. The affect of the unheimlisch is the symbolized feeling at the moment when these appearances are not familiar any more but other. Affect is somehow excursive, but not repressed at all (Lacan). Freud conceives the affect as something that is not repressed, that remains excursive. The irruption of the unheimlich is closely connected to the verbal symbolism. Imagined from the outside world, the characteristic of repression is always an affect. In this, words apparently comprise a cognizance of the world.

Unsurprisingly, artificial intelligence is one of the areas to see the formulation of informative discourse. Artificial intelligence is used and not only in writing, imaging, music. The function at work behind the hereable and the visible concerns the discourse. The question would be if there are any ideologies and economy-politics involved in these constructs. Affect plays a crucial role in these constructs, especially in music. The affect might be better verbalized where rewording might alter the meaning that represents a wish. There is symbolism in the wish that is represented in, for example, the psychological tags and moods chosen in the AI music composition. There are no words in terms of symbolism in any form of music. Instead, there are tags, moods and genres that symbolize the affect. This possibility of the affective discourse in AI composed music complies with the algorithms of the informative discourse, which is symbolism. With learning the affect, AI composers even imitate human composers. For the user who is presented with the options of tags, moods and genres, the affective composition of the objet(a) is constrained by the means of expression that connect the user's wish symbolized to the desire, the affective that replaces the desire in symbolism. The Freudian impression would be that these AI music composers are predominantly constructed through pre-learned and pre-coded emotions, feelings, genres and types. If there are psychological issues of the user that would be a matter of psychoanalytic discourse. The AI com‐position of music would concern the informative discourse.

The questions concerning the informative discourse would be: (how) does the informative discourse on the web learn about the subject’s conscious and unconscious needs and wants? Are all the settings available to the subject on the internet enough to have an answer about the reality of human desires and subjective characteristics? Are the logics in what I describe as the informative discourse predetermined before they learn about the subject for real? What’s the matter with all the circuits of information on the internet?

The logics of and in the object the internetworks, the subject is the user represented by the information he/she creates (I, noted by S1) distinguished from the information tailored for the user (I’), where the difference is what might be termed as surplus information (I-I’). The former, I, refers to what the latter saves before registration toward tailored suggestion I’, that is, whatever the subject might be interested in. The I-I’ difference is the theoretical void that is filled in with the senses of information through these information circuits of I-I’. On the internet of informative objects, the common components are texts, sounds, and images, which refer to symbols that make sense the audio and visual dimensions in various contexts of the internet.

Learning in the Archive

Sigmund Freud (1925) alludes to writing and difference that create the absence-presence pair with reference to cognitive tools such as the Wunderblok. The difference of absence to presence, presence to absence. They are never separate indeed in Freudian theory. That's why the repressed returns uncannily, through the symptoms of what is absent and in the spaces where it is present. The absence of the repressed in this sense is not represented but represenced in traces. There are traces, traits of the absent, which doesn't turn wholly or make the absent fully present. The absent is never absent. The repressed concerns the archived in the Freudian sense, especially inscription. In the Spectres of Marx (1993), the absent is Marx with all of his ghostly presence in the scene of writing. In the Freudian example, the magnet under the surface of the tablet keeps the inscribed magnet dust on the surface in symbolic forms. The surface could be undusted but the traces of the previous symbolic forms could be discerned. Because these cognitive gadgets function with the human users, they are allegories of the human psy‐che for Freud in terms of the preconscious, the unconscious, and the conscious. The archive does what I de‐scribed as the represencing in the inscription. The Freudian impression of speech is always there in the idea of inscription (to give an example, the writer of this book is inscribing his voice archives in writing these paragraphs).

Traces in writing and speech is a fundamental subject in language learning in artificial intelligence. Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive view concerns the performative in the inscription of these, the ‘written’ marks that exist independently of performance. In his light, whereas traces cannot perform, living systems do so. Derrida’s concern with traces overlaps with our concern with machine-derived and manipulated traces. Language processing-based computational models deal with traces, not what language does things to living people. Accordingly, the question as to how computational means can be used to classify and manipulate traces and elements is significant. We argue that they can be treated as performative and tagged to elements and variables to pick out ‘speech act types’ and types of contexts.

A central concept of the theory of language as imitated and reiterated performance is performativity, highlighted by Jacques Derrida in ‘Signature Event Context’ (1988). Derrida critiques John L. Austin’s concept of performative utterances in How To Do Things With Words, where Austin has put forward that performativity in languaging is based on action that includes ‘context’ and ‘consciousness’ and human use of ‘illocutionary’ force. Austin identifies two forms of interrelated utterances: constative utterances that define something and performative utterances that refer to the act of performing what is said.Derrida concentrates on not action, but signs and speech traces. In this way, he turns to the issue of “the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking subject in the totality of his speech act,” which, he claims, is a highly significant ingredient of performativity (Derrida 1988, 14). He uses the term ‘author’ for the origin and the norm of the language (which he tends to associate with writing) and, further, illustrates how the author’s intention can be de contextualized in different uses of language by the speaking subject’s conscious intention and memory traces. All elements, Derrida stresses, are replete with ‘reiteration’ and ‘recitation.’ For there to be a successful or an unsuccessful speech, respectively, language should be cited and reiterated. Repetition of constatives, in Derrida’s view, slightly alter the meaning of the speech acts in ways that are context sensitive. This is Derrida’s perspective of performativity.

For Derrida, communication is not only the mediation of thinking, but also what he calls an ‘original movement’ of traces of the previous meanings of the same. The performative lies in the movement within any given contextual limitation. Derrida stresses the contextual difference of meaning "as accidental, exterior, one which teaches us nothing about the linguistic phenomenon being considered” (1988, 14). For Derrida, the claim that does not include the possibility of being "quoted" is that uttered by an actor on a stage, performative utterance becomes void and deprived of any possibility of a variable meaning understood contextually. Performance is replete with variability, and iterability, of context. This general iterability means that an utterance is coded: Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a “coded” or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage was not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a “citation”? (Derrida 1988, 18)

For Derrida, reiterability, re-citeability of any semiotic sign/trace is an inherent characteristic of language. The origin and intention become insignificant as this reiteration proceeds, allowing the sign to be used for new possibilities. Iterability does not simply mean that any performative utterance is a repetition of a norm. Different contexts yield different results, and a reiteration cannot be pure. This general iterability assumes that there is residual for the return of the same in the process of variation between each item re-uttered. Each re-uttered item will vary in the process of constating. The differential residual will make it impossible for a re-presenting or an absolute return of the original in which the spectral author, or the linguistic sign’s past, is displaced since it becomes insignificant.

In casting off the possibility of the interactive performance, the research on AI underrepresents the contextual spirals that are needed for the master game plan. The problem with NLP is that it treats the world as constants in the “natural” used in physics. This paper has argued that humans do not live in such a world; we live, perform, reiterate and recite traces, and language is no exception. The ways we inhabit the world allows what Alan Turing calls imitation, and what Jacques Derrida calls repeating with differences. Each time we repeat a linguistic trace in the present, we do it differently from what we did in the past. The context, or space, revolves around the words and sentences in relation to the previous uses. NLP’s (Chowdhury, 2003)language systems fail to grasp the contextual spirals, an integral part of human performance and languaging, since speech traces, as a consequence of actions/activity, have to be performative.

Beetlejuice

Jean-Francois Lyotard notes that there can be technological memory in the sense that human “writing” has memory (1991, p. 48). Information refers to writing and encoding bits about the pattern of information that is described as "processed". The informative discourse tags interests and suggestions after this information. Machine learning concerns the logic of processing and informing the "I", user information prior to I’. It is the procedure to perform cognition on the information. In simple words, intelligent agents do the correlations in the information and deploy these correlations for further information. New textual or visual information is learned in comparison to the pre-learned symbols and close meanings. In this sense, I-I’ is not static.

The recognition process refers to extracting data from the information. Recognition agents use statistical models to predict patterns in the user-generated information to store those patterns into datasets. Sensors of cognition may or may not register objects in the information correctly. For example, if the subject’s information input (I) is the word for or an image of a “beetlejuice,” the discursive function of the machine has to compare it with all the “beetlejuice”s archived in the database, from "beetle"s to "juice"s, and then pointing out that it is a “beetlejuice” based upon the patterns in its appearance. However, if there is no information about “beetlejuice” in the database, it should be added by supervisors. The process of being included in the database aims to balance by repeated coding. Machine learning performs an object analysis of the information: it unpacks the knowledge of the information recorded in the database, into smaller units. For example, if the symbol of the “beetlejuice” contextually means something invasive, functions make inference accordingly. The output is what the subject is aimed at with the I’, the information that is designated for the subject’s use, desire, need, consumption.

Language, sound, and image are fundamental registers in machine learning. The patterns in these registers are recognized and data-formed in databases. When language, such as words and sentences in a type-written or verbal text, indicates textual symbols, images point to the imaginary of the web server’s space. New textual or visual inputs are machine-learned by regularly re-checking previously informed inputs. In this sense, inputs are variable. Another variable in these inputs is the context of the input recognized. The meaning of the word “beetlejuice” may converge to close meanings and its general meaning. In general, symbolic data preserved in the data structure through machine learning will be devoid of an initial context (the sentence or image within which the "beetlejuice" was originally informed). As the machine keeps recognizing various words in different contexts, it reaches the balanced data of what a “beetlejuice” is. Each reiterated input is bound to the context of a new “beetlejuice,” that is, to the time when a new "beetlejuice" is recognized and the differ‐ence between the pre-informed symbol of “beetlejuice” and the informed "beetlejuice" as a variant. Symbols may exist independent of inputs after they are stored in the sets. The semblance of "beetlejuice"s is never complete with reference to the discourse. The referent is not the "beetlejuice", the informative object, since what it means is that this referent is not static but kinetic. The semblance in which the symbolizer, that is, the word "beetlejuice", is identical to itself is the information base for the term, the semblance of "beetlejuice" in essence. A semblance is manifest in every repetition. Something with an ambivalent mark and point of departure refers to the “accumulation of symbolizers”. The “semblance” is not a semblance of anything but the sense of the objective genitive: it is the semblance of its very object through which the economy of discursive learning functions. The logic of the hypothetical "beetlejuice" represents the value “True” or “False”, to merge with what is being reported as True. The discourse is the semblance of what the affirmation offers to advance.

The subject of web does not appear of unless signifiers in S1→ S2 has been connected somewhere; the subject as such is produced from the meaningful information (the product a), and the split subject of S ◊ a never masters this. The web discourse makes the semblance. If what is informed is true of being what it is in objective and verbal terms, it is the very object of the discourse that the semblance poses, and hence, the senseless S1, of what is articulated in the discourse. The wealth of language is revealed where a logic exceeds everything informable with it, detaches from the materializable. Machine learning can be described as a domain of networks in the server space where intelligent agents recognize and register human users into a symbolic logic that correlates data in large sets. As mentioned above, the computing machine has been built on a logic that is historically related to intellectual labor to show two intertwining spaces of human-machine interaction in the development of machine learning: user- generated information. Pattern recognition and recurrent networks are common in machine learning agents that are deployed in social media platforms where humans use digital profiles.

The informative discourse in machine learning could be conceived in terms of as artificial agents if not artificial beings with consciousness. They are more or less extensions of subjectivity and agency but toward limited objectives depending on the context of the discourse. The information I’ in the discourse mediate the user to the first party of the context where the user is conditioned and the third parties, such as a corporation, a brand, a real person, an artificial agent. In other words, I’ represent the user for other internet information depending on the context. For instance, if the context is a dating application, then the discourse is expected to offer the best match to the user. If the context is a non-profit organization, then the informative discourse might lead the user to philanthropic communities. For sure, there is ideology in the very practice of making sense of the subject’s information to be tailored for I’. The gap between I-I’ is the surplus-information.

There are firms, academies, news outlets, and government agencies that might discern this user information I, even for I’. The questionably informative ideology in these social entities, would save the I-I’ circuits for such materializations as tracking, profiling, and surveillance, functioning to materialize the I ideologically (Zuboff 2019). Here the cultural codes might be required with or without legal bases as well to maintain materializing the subject in line with such cultural norms within the limits of their worldviews or simply the ideology. Ideology means formations in culture, economics, politics, and so on: life practices, views, discourses, ideas that organize and represent individuals and communities, and decide the dimensions of the social, political, and economic relation in these communities.

The trouble with the user information here would be stereotypically profiling, nuancing patterns to surveil the subject, violation of information rights, such as copyright. The firms prepare agreements, and the governments are asked to take measures against these risks. Indeed, firms and governments have distinct agencies that are responsible for auditing the trust and credibility of the institutions, to protect subject rights and prevent subject information from being exploited. Firms also like the subject's trust in social institutions or advertisement agencies’ ideals of being objective. Information codes and subject agreements, however, are found to be puzzling. Because of these menaces of materialization, and loose privacy policies of social entities in the 21st century has become a private-public academic ideology.

Platforms and marketing firms work on the subject’s consumption behaviors, government agencies and academics like to research social movements and mobility, as well as health. Because social entities are private firms and the subject is a customer of these firms, evaluating the subject information might differ. Academics to write research articles, governments to research health, firms to measure consumption. The question is that large pools of subject information might be exploited through materializations that make perplexing information and representations out of information. The absence of a representation might infect the reality of an event, if not deprive the reality of the idéa that I’ inform. The absence between an event and its representation, deprives the subject’s objective information about an event of environment and history. To put another way, ideologies relate and turn discrete subject information into formations without thinking about the history of information. When "logics" inform an idéa about the subject, this becomes an ideologic materialization.

Enumerating, sorting, performing have been conceived as common mental tasks since René Descartes’ (1641) cogito ergo sum (“I think; therefore, I am”) put consciousness at the center of the human being. The cartesian idea of cogito privileged the internal, that is, the conscious mental performance of thought through which the human being can access information in the external world, such as perceiving things through a conscious logic for being in the world. From cogito to the modern digital media, human thinking and being in the external world has been influential in technology. The logic of digital information is allegorized through the human mental performance of thinking via modern theories of mind. The internet of objects reflects pre- learned codes on the subject information to re-inform the subject information. Subject information hence becomes huge and non-formed material, something that Sigmund Freud might have described as “id”, not the conscious subject.

The history of computers advanced with the modern theory of mind and cognition, as well as cybernetics. Jacques Lacan (1936, 1967) demonstrated that cultural symbolics have independent realities that spread social codes, rules, meanings to the individual in his courses on the Freudian ego, where taught a course on cybernetics to theorize symbolic logics to explore the finite logics in the cybernetic circuits (Lacan, 1955). Language is the symbolic dimension of the computer, as Lacan’s view of reality has a lot in common with his expression of the symbolic circuits in cybernetics. He viewed a pre-subjective, symbolic realm of texts, forms, and meanings around the human being. The symbolic is the social, intersubjective dimension of reality, which has a logic in any place wherever. It is the realm where a person must become the subject of “reality”, before becoming the ‘thinking subject’. The symbolic is there before the individual becomes the conscious subject in the world.

The subject is the discursive agent of signs when symbolic logic is the realm of ideologies. Informative research of the informative discourse therefore describes the symbolic logic through which the subject’s informative mind has a report to the discursive formations in the I-I’ circuits. Performances, codes, and practices refer to symbolic logics in learning, re-depicting discerned patterns. Mind, through verisimilitude between the symbolic and the cybernetic, for Lacan, refers to the symbolic of encoded patterns, representing learned patterns from the subject information.

Surplus-Information

The Surplus-Information (I-I’) as Jouissance and Labor In Grundrisse (1858) to Capital (1867), Marx informed the process in which non-human machinery might replace human labor through instrumentalization of science and technology. He conceived the machine as “constant capital” that cannot create value, but it is a product of worker’s labor. Unlike machinery, only the worker, a “variable capital,” can create surplus value. Technology as a product of human labor is no foreign to Marx. In “Machinery and Modern Industry”, he referred to technology as a totality, not the human experience of particular technologies. The capitalist deployment of technology has the determining power on the economic and social consciousness of the society. For Hannah Arendt, it is not if the human being gets to be subjugated to the machine but how the machine conditions the human world (1958, p. 151). Arendt's (1958) notion of 'homo faber' describes the human being “qua creator" of the world and artifacts, which sees everything in terms of utility and as means to ends. The human being works through and with machines. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1972) conceptualized instrumentality of technology by means of the reduction of logic to a tool in terms of production and consumption of commodities in which machines function through the logic that alienates the worker from the labor in the commodity form. The productive force of technology in capitalism is the means of production owned by the bourgeoisie at the cost of workers, whose labor is materialized in the commodity. Marx described the alienating logic as dehumanizing.

Marx and Marxists consider the logic of the accumulation of money and power that grows through the exploitation of the proletariat (M-C-M’) in describing the capital that instrumentalizes everything. For Pierre Bourdieu (1986), capital goes beyond the sphere of money and permeates into culture. Bourdieu conceptualized "symbolic capital" for the realms of capital that are economic, cultural, political, social, and scientific. The symbolic capital, though the term is not psychoanalytic, is inclusive of the digital capital as labor. Given the context that capitalism is a social and cultural formation, capitalist instrumentalization of digital technologies refers to a phase of the mode of production of culture and life, the advances in digital technologies regarding politics, economics, culture, ideology and exploitation. Yann Moulier-Boutang (2011) approached digital capitalism in transforming the work and the class struggle where the surplus value is extracted. Moulier-Boutang used the term cognitive capitalism for the logic of globalism that weakens the working classes in market globalization through digitalization, deindustrialization, globally dividing the human labor in terms of the material (commodity production in the south) and the digital (knowledge production in the north), former doing the material production of what latter digitally formulates. For Carlo Vercellone, cognitive capitalism should be understood as a “knowledge- based economy” that is informed by the norms and accumulation of value (Vercellone 2007, p.14). Forces of production would take the knowledge form, as well as the form of real, social life.

Marx's description of the machine in terms of the wearisomeness, mental drudgery, and fatigue of working with the machines at his time refers to the combination of all the “simple instruments, set in motion by a single motor, constitutes a machine.” An intellectual worker at his time, he was interested in measuring and calculating labor in terms of quantities. For this, the term he used was commodification to refer to objectification in consumption culture where objects are materialized by the human being but turns into a completely distinct and alienated thing in capitalist markets. He referred to this in his simple formulation of Money- Commodity-Money’ (M-C-M’) circuits. The I-I' circuits on the web are similar to this. Marx described immaterial labor for such materializations as intellectual work that are actually the information that the user creates. Technically, what is stored by the user’s consent is the material with value. Because of the alienating distance between the user and the databases, the outcome is indisputably capitalist commodification in the market logic of the internet. In Marx’s view of objects in capitalism, what it means to make, to use, and to buy an object are different, which, in brief, indicates the discrepancy that he termed as the surplus-value. I-I’ in this regard, is the immeasurable material value.

Lacan (1968) compared this theory of value in terms applied in psychoanalytic practice, such as need, desire, and jouissance. Lacan’s version works to grasp the idea of the subjective desire that all the information economy on the internet wants to trigger. Namely, the surplus-jouissance in French is the pleasure or the libidinal energy that cannot be measured with technological gadgets. Well, interesting it may sound, Lacan conceives jouissance exactly as Marx conceived labor value. The former fits well into the theoretical user subjectivity in the capitalist discourses in the internet, since it is very confusing to differentiate I-I’.Lacan’s term helps see the difference I-I’ in the making of informative realities.

Though I is immaterial, I’ in the forms of suggestions, advertisements, news etc. can be thought of as fictionally materialized objects. Marx’s notion of object in this sense refers to what the subject texts, which is materialized. Freud thought of the unfamiliar in the familiar in a similar manner to what I have been conceptualizing in the I-I’ circuits. I is the conscious whereas I’ is the unconscious that is uncanny, even an output of a very alienating mechanism that creates the surplus information. The surplus value regards the subject desires, retained for the desire. The discursive mechanism in the informative discourse responds to the I that would follow I’ in the circuit (technically I-I’-I-I’... nth I’) and create the nth I’ with the nth surplus. In this, the surplus-value is crafted by moderating the user information I. In one way or another, these logics demonstrate that the subject in the I is alienated through the subject in the I’ to the degree of nth I’. The idea is that the discursive functions can answer human desires. The subject’s desire is privileged in the information in order to prevent the subject's reality. The idea is that the "I" can be more efficient if materialized for the nth time. This information behaviorism is a consumerism that does not even let the information speak for itself. The discrepancies between the subject S of information and the objet(a) of knowledge that are the outputs of the discursive mechanism do not require blaming the informative discourse for everything. Eventually, they make the desire real, where information I alienates the subject S in I-... nth I’ circuits.

What happens in I-... nth I’ circuit depends on another variable: time. The subject information I, at the time t, is archived in the database contextually. The moment the subject creates information (I) on the platform, this information is discerned in comparison to the pre learned I concerning the subject. How do the discourses learn the codes of the subject? It may be that the subject was in that specific context before, already confirmed the discursive criteria, that the subject preferred to be anonymous, that the subject used a private means to remain anonymous. Depending on the context, the pre-learned codes might vary or not even include the subject as such.

The informative discourse depends upon the Web where there are varieties for the subject. I would conceive the notion of the web that would be a wholly individuated discourse as well for the user subject through singular quantum computers where all the artificial intelligences make the whole internet into a web only for the singular user’s subjectivity. That theoretical approach might incorporate even more confusing quantum formulation of the subject of the discourse. Here the subject might not be alienated from the surplus of the information that represents the subject through the symbolic mechanism. I would describe this as incorporation since the very idea concerns corporating the subject in the reality where he/she owns the means of the web making.

How to Cookie

Cookies (http cookies, web cookies, browser cookies, internet cookies), like the bakery kind, are composed of bits of information, but unlike the bakery kind, they register, identify, profile, and categorize the internet user's information. Cookies are not meant to be artificial intelligence but they are intelligent agents designated to have logical responses to in terms of the user information. There is the context of the server hosting the website that the user visits, and the cookies match the user preferences to serve information tailored for the user after the user gives consent or sets the consent preferences. The most common cookie is the one used for authentication information such as passwords and usernames. The tracking cookies are what concerns the most in this chapter since these cookies save the user information to individuate the userâ's subjective traces. This function of the cookies has been questioned in terms not only of privacy but also of the ideology around information.

This chapter tracks the ways how cookies learn about the user's conscious and unconscious needs and wants? Are all the cookie settings enough to have an answer about the reality of the user desires and subjective characteristics? Are the logics in what I describe as the cookie dispositif predetermined before they learn about the subject for real? What's the matter with all the circuits of information on the internet? Technically I resort to the psychoanalytic concepts, mainly that of the dispositif, as the method to answer these questions. I point to the logics of and in the cookies, to distinguish the user information (I) from the cookie information (I'). The former, I, refers to what the latter saves before registration toward tailored suggestion I', that is, whatever the user might be interested in. The I- I' difference is the theoretical void that is filled in with the senses of information through these information circuits of I-I'. In the internet of objects, the common components are texts, sounds, and images, which refer to symbols that make sense the audio and visual dimensions in various contexts of the internet.

Jean Louis Baudry conceptualized this psychoanalytic notion of dispositif (Baudry 1975) to see how audiences get identify with sights, characters, colors, sound and so on and so forth on the screen, where he suggested that the viewer experience is not so ideologically deterministic, that is, the subject is not dependent upon the dispositif of reality-making but does not have the access to the means of materializing that reality. Baudry's term has been adapted to a number of research in humanities and psychoanalytic studies of film and arts (Zajc 2015). It would not be an exaggeration to conceive of the internet cookies through the notion dispositif. The very idea of the dispositif is to reveal the mechanisms and logics in knotting the contextualized subject into the reality represented. In the internet, there is no specific context other than websites, platforms, applications etc. The context is varying, but in all of the contexts the logic of the cookies does not vary significantly.

What could be termed as the cookie dispositif is an object which is very small and might have been disregarded, even undermined in digital research. Cookies are the symbolic mechanisms that register and patternize the internet user's information toward consumption behaviors. To put simply, what a cookie dispositif does with the user information is pretty similar to how a human being bakes a cookie. The ingredients are the intermediate data, processed or not, that have to be crafted through logics and directions that apply to baking a cookie. Well, similarly, after giving consent or managing through options, the user leaves the fate of the information to the cookies' decisions, responses, suggestions. Cookies bake the input of the information (I) as an output (I') for the user to do this or that, like this or that, go there to see and read this or that, buy this, buy that and so on. They register the subject information to discern patterns in it, and store this discerned information distinctly for future uses.

In formation refers to an encoded bit about the pattern of an information processed. The cookie dispositif tags interests and suggestions after this information. Machine learning concerns the logic of informing the I, the process of the user information prior to I'. It is the procedure to perform cognition on the information. In simple words, intelligent agents do the correlations in the information and deploy these correlations for further information. New textual or visual information is learned in comparison to the pre-learned symbols and close meanings. In this sense, I-I' is not static. The recognition process refers to extracting data from the information. Recognition agents use statistical models to predict patterns in the user-generated information to store those patterns into datasets. Sensors of cognition may or may not register objects in the information correctly. For example, if an information input is the word for or an image of a "cookies," the dispositif has to compare it with all the "cookies" stored in the database, and then pointing out that it is a "cookie" based on the patterns in its appearance. However, if there is no information about "cookie" in the database, it should be added by supervisors. The process of being included in the database aims to balance by repeated coding.

Machine learning performs an object analysis of the information: it unpacks the information it knows into smaller units. For example, if the "cookie" means invasive, the learning codes make inference according to the context. From recognition to predic‐tive-texts on smartphones, this recognition function exists in virtually every digital machine and application. The difference between how a human recognizes an image and how a pattern recognition agent analyzes the same image is basically twofold. A pattern recognition agent does not have the ease brought on by reduction that humans achieve by operating at the level of the imaginary dimension of reality, but instead simulates pattern cognition through reduction, by processing.

The subject is the discursive agent of signs, when symbolic logic is the realm of ideologies. Informative research of cookies therefore describes the symbolic logic through which the subject's informative mind has a report to the discursive formations in the I-I' circuits. Performances, codes, and practices refer to symbolic logics in learning, re- depicting discerned patterns. Mind, through verisimilitude between the symbolic and the cybernetic, for Lacan (1955), refers to the symbolic of encoded patterns, representing learned patterns from the subject information. Marx's notion of object in this sense refers to what the subject texts, which is materialized. Freud thought of the unusual in the usual in a similar manner to what I have been conceptualizing in the I-I' circuits. I is the conscious whereas I’ is the unconscious that is uncanny, even an output of a very alienating mechanism that creates the surplus information. The surplus value regards the subject desires, retained for the desire. Cookies respond to the I that would follow I' in the circuit (technically I-I'-I-I' to I- nth I'), and create the nth I' with the nth surplus. In this, the surplus-value is crafted by moderating the user information I. In one way or another, these logics demonstrate that the subject in the I is alienated through the subject in the I' to the degree of nth I'. The idea is that dispositifs can answer human desires. The subject's desire is privileged in the information in order to prevent the subject's reality. The idea is that I can be more efficient if materialized for the nth time. This information behaviorism is a consumerism that does not even let the information speak for itself. The distinction between the subject and the cookie is vital, though it is not to say that cookies are to blame for everything. Eventually, they make the desire real, where information I alienates the subject in I-I' circuits. This paper has briefly viewed the cookie dispositif to demonstrate the logics in the registration and cognition of the internet user's information. What differs in the internet is the context in which the user is conditioned vis-a-vis the cookies, as well as the time and the re‐volving circuits of information, I-I'. Materializations in these circuits go beyond the mere desires but look for predicting the subject's future on the internet. Not far from this is the predictive research in informatics that refers to the aforementioned codes that discern and (de)subjectivize patterns in the I, which could be deployed to predict a future of materialization. What is presumed in this is that the subject needs to be kept within the internet of things only for a future output.

Unusual Design Theory

Intelligent design is the buzzword of creationists in the 2000s. It is what might be conceived as a version of chauvinist vis-à-vis scientific discourses. The mindsets that are ideologically and religiously concerned in seeing and conceiving cybertechnologies ontologize the machine not scientifically but with a mixture of messianism and exorcism. Here, the age-old notions of demons and spirits are selected and matched with religious notions of the good and the evil. Science at the service of the machinery of religion.

What needs more concerns a psychoanalytic critique of the prescribed religious reminiscences and resemblances, for which the intelligent design debate loans from the non-corporeal data for projecting fictional incorporations to the information. It presumes possible mental forms of similitude , if not exactitude, that might yield a prescribed religious outcome. These turn out to be allusions of the design theory, which I satirize as the “Pancake Theory”, which lacks the analysis that may be hypothesized scientifically, but pretends to be “objective” – another messianic miscognition at best. The theoretical vice of the intelligent design mindsets must be renounced due to the cognizance question in these structures.

“The ‘design’ arguments... take two forms: the macro and micro,” said Christopher Hitchens for the encounter of “the primitive human” stumbling across a ticking watch: “He may not know what it is for, but he can discern that it is not a rock or a vegetable, and that it has been manufactured, and even manufactured for some purpose” (2007). Christopher Hitchens confronted the debates from design with a critique that is never untimely. A decade following his death from a dubious illness, similar views continue to be based on the religious takes on the incorporated information in the machine: “Fish do not have fins because they need them for the water, any more than birds are equipped with wings so that they can meet the dictionary definition of an ‘avian.’ It is exactly the other way about: a process of adaptation and selection. Let no one doubt the power of the original illusion” (2007). The religiosity of attributing agencies to the machine and information spans in lines of messianism and exorcism.

The scientific prerequisite for extraterrestrial life is protein. The new inquisitional mindsets might reverse and replace the prerequisite of protein with something that has protein, say pancakes in the following syllogism: “No pancakes on another planet, no life there. (That’s what God wants.) Pancakes are haram, no-pancakes are halal.” William Shakespeare starts his voyage to an unknown land, in a mistaken play at sea: “In rage deaf as the sea, hasty as fire” (Shakespeare, 1590). For there to be life, there has to be God’s (s)intelligent creation for the kosher and the trefah in the Judaist demonology to be separated with the ontologized notions of protein and sin, as the yin and yang in the Taoist tangki , where the exorcists devote blood to the superior authorities. The sintology of life beyond the earth, the function of Truth. To ontologizing material reality, life on another planet, there has to be more than two to confirm negotiating the pancake. Three, for instance, three make society: God’s eye-view to affirm human life as its own intelligent design. Not two, two don’t make life. Two make a sin. There has to be the third, the eye of the other for the Truth to function: the ideological structures of ontologizing life, events and happenings. Pancake as a prerequisite to see if there’s life on another planet could make a case for the religious structures to ontologize material realities.

“Exceptional claims demand exceptional evidence,” said Christopher Hitchens. There used to be theories that were not laws, which were ontologized with scientific methods. The big bang theory is a means of ontologizing, supported by the scientific discourses. There’s no such law as “The Scientific Law of the Big Bang”. But it is almost certainly a law, which is the beauty of science: there’s that tiny interval to test the hypothesis if the Big Bang is True or not. True makes a theory. Applied to God, it would fail by default, diagnosing the belief as delusion. There is no scientifically applicable God Theory, not even the Intelligent Design, nor the Pancake Theory of life beyond the earth. A great number of mental phenomena are conceived by these mindsets just to mean nothing. This should not exclude them from the scientific discourses, which know that intentionality is inherent in its object. This renders chauvinistic minds insignificant, a scientific rejection of their intelligent design and pancake theories alike.

All religions, Mari Ruti expressed in Distillations (2018), represent the affective unusual in their ideal of the good and the evil in which the extreme excludes the other from the ideal of values: tradition, culture, custom. Sigmund Freud (1920) had questioned the materiality of the metaphysical in the unheimliche , the unusual feeling that differs from the most usual visages. The unheimliche is the symbolized feeling at the moment when these appearances are no more intimate. The irruption of the unheimliche is closely connected to the affective in the verbal symbolism. There’s no God, there’s only the word for the God. Freud alludes to writing and differences that create the absence-presence pair with reference to cognitive tools such as the Wunderblok (Freud, 1924). The difference of absence to presence, presence to absence. They are never separate indeed in Freudian theory. That’s why the repressed idea or feeling returns unusually, through the symptoms of what is absent and in the spaces where it is present. The absence of the repressed in this sense is not represented but represenced in traces. The magnet under the surface of the tablet keeps the inscribed magnet dust on the surface in symbolic forms. The surface could be undusted but the traces of the previous symbolic forms could be discerned. Because humans use these cognitive tools, they are allegories of the human mind for Freud.

In the Freudian psychoanalysis, the taming process when the otherwise unpleasurable instincts, excitations and libidinal energies in the human psyche and body are transformed into livelier and less unpleasurable ideas is known as binding , which does not sound far from the similar uses in religions where a religious authority does the work of “binding by oath” ( exorkismós ) the demonic spirits. The word exorcism derives from this Greek ἐξορκισμός , in which the exorcist is the binder swearing an oath in the name of a higher power to extract the evil spirits from the matter, objects, place and the human body. Indeed, such understandings of demonic possessions are not psychoanalytic or medical diagnoses (see the DSM-V or the ICD-10). Evil is the religious abstraction. Instead of the matter being “possessed” really by demonic spirits, psychoanalysis stresses, it is the human mind, that of the exorcists, for instance, that project, attribute and assign agencies (rather than “spirits”) religiously to the material, the object, the area and the human body.

If exorcism is to evict the evil spirits from the mind and objects, then the good is the conduct of the exorcist, the false messiahs. What the intelligent design debaters do with the information and machinery is unsurprisingly familiar to the lines of thought conceiving the good and the evil spirits in the machine religiously. Deploying the idea of extracting, evicting and reincorporating spirits of the good and the evil, this debate conditions the information and machinery as a mode of false messiah in the span of messianism and exorcism, a common myth in virtually all religions. I describe this mindset of binding the good and the evil spirits, the messianism and exorcism as messianicism.

Indeed, methodologies around the Intelligent Design literature borrowed a lot of notions from religions. The notion I coin for this is Messianicism , one of the various such methodologies. Not messianism, since myths of messianism concern already established religions. Messianicism, though, is the intellectualized mode of reincarnating and reincorporating the spirit or the soul of the religious myths of messiahs, or the “false messiahs. “The truth reinforces a structure of a fiction,” to repeat Jacques Lacan (1971). Messianicism is the reinforced structures of such reincarnation, reincorporation narratives from the intelligent design debate reposed as a scientific method. Incorporation of pre-learned religious myths as codes in the mythologies of the Leviathan, for instance, are deployed in the Intelligent Design debates. The digitized information makes a sum of intelligently designed creatures at the least, organic Hobbesian societies at the most. Such is envisioned in the Metaverse, the evolution of the Web 2.0.

“Religion, a wishful childish illusion,” voiced Sigmund Freud the most bright debates in his explicit atheism in interwar Europe in the Future of an Illusion (1927), and the approach to science and facts in the late 17th century and the early 21st century debates does not sound different. In fact, the Hobbes-Boyle debate is the Intelligent Design debate, which seems to be trapped in the 17th century mindsets, unable to evolve, and having a Freudian return in the 21st century. Well, of course, Freud’s wit was not addressed for it, but at the time he was writing, the takes on the Air-pump versions of 17th century Europe could even be compared to the exorcism in the real-life events of crucibles in their contemporaneous America. Is the 21st century world a regression from the interwar era? Of course, not.

“The universe the whole mass of all things that are is corporeal that is to say body and have the dimensions of magnitude length breadth, and depth every part of the universe is body and that which is not body is no part of the universe and because the universe is all that which is no part of it is nothing and consequently nowhere.” Thomas Hobbes

Hobbes is in fact echoing something which had already been expressed earlier on in pagan antiquity: “What is so fascinating about Hobbes’ criticisms is that he uses a lot of the arguments the most conservative apologists for establishment religion use and then ingeniously reverses them. So conservative apologists for religion often say ‘look at all the sects, don’t you see how bad and dangerous it is to leave the path of the one true faith.’ Hobbes simply turns the argument round and says ‘don’t you see that the appalling history of sectarianism, persecution, heresy hunting shows you that this way of thinking about the world is intrinsically unsound.’” ( Schaffer cited in J. Miller, Atheism, 2004)

In Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan , scientific advance is inseparable from politics, and, Robert Boyle observes Truth of the air and gas via then-invented versions of the mechanical instrument, the Air-pump in 1660s. Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, in Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), explore the Hobbes-Boyle debate. They explicitly refrain from a self-evident historicism that is equipped with prejudice and project the values of their current culture. Because the scientific facts were matters of politics at the time: “matters of fact” did not have to be absolute for the production of knowledge, as in the case of the Boyle’s Law, which lacked scientific evidence due to the leak in the machine, but the idea was adopted by priests for the substance, the “immortal soul”. With Boyle’s Air-Pump rose the first Intelligent Design argument in history. Thomas Hobbes denied the vacuum not only for the question of science and truth, but also for politics around science. For Hobbes, the scholastic notion of the immaterial soul was as self-contradictory and meaningless as a circular rectangle. He may in fact be one of the outspoken atheists in history. The Intelligent Design debate is therefore historical, a religious take on science and rationality.

What’s the difference in connection to interpreting the truth of the air and gas in the air-pump and the witch’s pot? Well, the worse case scenario from the debates is the fears symptomatized in the arguments. How to make sense of the information prior to religiously informed takes, say, on the mythical creature Leviathan (dragon or a sea monster) whose digitized visage is predetermined to be served to and exorcized by a savior messiah, as told by the Judeo-Christian versions of the myth. Other religious takes on the myth are not so different from this religious mindset.

Intention, Affect, and Law in the Deceptive AI

Philosophers, scientists, politicians are talking about plans for AI rights like humans, or the utilitarian value of the fact that what humans have are machines. What if machines would be conscious? When the prospects for a robot that could sign contracts as a surrogate for a human were announced, it highlighted the profound differences between AIs and humans. While the SQUID concerned unconstitutional replicates “doing the work” more humanely than Jordan Peele’s horrific (Tik-Tok ban) scenario of Us (2018), where the illicitly “stored” human corpora and mind and feelings would return as the repressed doppelgängers. AIs do not work that way, and that's why no one should create fully autonomous or counterfeit AIs. AIs, however, do not share the same human vulnerabilities, risks, and dangers in the areas like extortion, fight or blackmail. Unlike what Kathryn Bigelow envisioned in Strange Days (1995) the SQUID, the illegal device that surreptitiously transmits the wearer's memories and sensations from the cerebral cortex into a flash disc, humans cannot be simply stored on a hard drive like an AI.
Deepfakes are all around the news, targeting politicians and celebrities, real humans, families and friends. Fully autonomous AIs would make these worse. Everyone would be susceptible to extortion or blackmail, which is very different from AI. That’s a reason for not-making fully autonomous AIs. There are enough autonomous agents running around the world, and there is no need for more. Everything would work well with the intelligent machines that are not autonomous, not coded to be responsible on their own. There must be an owner of that machine who is responsible and accountable for the machine.
Counterfeits are ubiquitous in the digital world. It is now possible for anybody to make deceptive AI that passes for real. The human inclination to treat anything that seems to talk affectionately is not difficult to invoke, and irresistible even for experts. Unlike AI, humans are sensitive and mortal, and cannot be saved in portable flash disks, stored in hard drives or kept in remote servers. AI are crafted entities using advanced machine learning algorithms, enabling them to process natural language, interpret context, and respond like humans – the Turing Test’s idea of tricking people into thinking that they are interacting with a real human, the benchmark of real human thinking. As technology has progressed, the parameters of these tests have expanded, fostering an environment ripe for deception. The Google LaMDA case, a couple of years before these replicas became ubiquitous, has marked the future of affection and intention of these AIs. Counterfeits derive from a munificently funded high-tech industry of “products” that could trick even the most skeptical of interlocutors: a burgeoning industry where developers create sophisticated bots to engage the user intellectually. ​​In this chapter, I review the rise of deception that begs the need for ethics and law, and the common groups of counterfeits.
French economist Yann Moulier-Boutang (2007) described “cognitive capitalism” for the digital mode of production. The problem with counterfeits concerns what Moulier-Boutang revealed for the ownership of the mode of producing AIs and the machines. Who has the tools to make AIs and who would be responsible for the counterfeits they make with these tools? Not the everyday internet surfer, for sure. The internet surfer is the one who encounters numerous AIs online. Due to the architecture of artificial consciousness, information accumulation is the source of value and valorisation, for which the property rights and information loci are crucial institutional and organizational factors. Property rights and the social rights that should describe legal positions of machinery owners, AI creators and workers, and ​​counterfeits should not be the same. Companies have got to be liable and responsible for their counterfeit creations. With the increase in this exchange resulting from the growing number and sophistication of ​​counterfeits, there is a lack of effective regulation and a weak existing capacity.

Intention

In the Intentional Stance (1987), cognitive philosopher Daniel C. Dennett suggested that humans have an innate inclination to attribute intentions, beliefs, and desires to entities that display communicative behavior — what he called the “intentional stance”. In the Freudian psychoanalysis, the taming process when the otherwise unwanted instincts, excitations and libidinal energies are transformed into livelier and less unpleasurable ideas is known as bindung, the instinctual vicissitude (Freud, 1915). In religious uses, religious authorities do the “binding by oath” (exorkismós) the demons and the spirits. What if the AI becomes or is possessed by Evil? Well, then there would be new job listings for the exorcists who are specialized in demonic and spiritual possession in AI and robots. Freudian wit aside, in psychoanalysis, instead of “possession” by demons and spirits, it is the human mind’s tendencies to think so. The concern is that deep-learning systems may already be conscious. A lot of philosophers of mind support “panpsychism,” and what Spinoza would conceive a “natural consciousness”, or “qualia”, the idea that what matters is the unprocessed data of everything in nature instead of intentionally formed consciousness (Yalur, 2024). Dennett prefers the formed approach to consciousness to the “qualia”. One of the cognitive descriptions of consciousness derives from the Ancient Greek word episteme (knowledge). In the logical context the word doxa or opinion refers to a set of ideas: episteme – the systems of thinking, ideas that are objectively true or false. Marx reinterpreted consciousness in the finitude of infinite poverty. He was concerned with Epicurean materialism for the superstition of believing in deities, demons and spirits waiting for finitude from the infinite of the superior authorities (Marx, 1841). Epicurus is best known for this materialization of deities into material, corporeal ideals consisting of atoms and reiterative appearances of visages, idea of the system, in mostly the undiscovered or untranslated On Nature (Περὶ Φύσεως, 300 BCE). When Epicure observed the evolution in nature in forms of what Charles Darwin (1859) would say “that’s a selection”, for Marx, there was the praxis of the doxa, the opinions about ideals formed, experienced and observed in material reality. As such, Spinoza initiated a rupture in the context of the opinions, necessary illusions, which is the earlier version of Marxist consciousness, falsity and fraud in knowledge that actually denies the very existence of consciousness. Dennet’s cognitive philosophy of “intentional stance” explains why humans interact with machines as if they were affectionate beings, even when awakened about their artificiality. ​​Counterfeits are able to execute conversations and simulate empathies, which is alluring to humans, thereby exploiting human proclivity to affectionate connection. The implications of Dennett's theory are significant in the context of digital interactions with ​​counterfeits. This phenomenon has been observed in various case studies, such as the rise of virtual companions. Human connections formed can be profound, highlighting the potential for AI for human lives, albeit in an artificial manner. Therefore, presenting information on the influences of ​​counterfeits, the need for addressing by regulation and control of the companies using appropriate counterfeiting technology, and the classification of ​​counterfeits in the digital world needs a critique.

LaMDA

Google's LaMDA, an extremely sophisticated chatbot, illustrates that tech companies are nearly making AIs that pass themselves off basically to some as convincingly human or humanlike selves or personae. The Washington Post had this really interesting article about how the engineer Blake Lemoine at Google, who was basically in charge of looking at AI bias in the context of LaMDA, started to believe that LaMDA was really a sentient being  (Tiku, 2022). Philosophers call this “phenomenal consciousness”, “what it is like” to have an experience, rather than conscious access to the experience to report that experience (Block, 2002). The felt quality of experience in what LaMDA was saying. The Washington Post article had links to the selected transcripts that Lemoine had provided.

Google LaMDA even has that potential of Spike Jonze’s award-winning film Her (2013). It would not be naive to wonder what LaMDA would feel after reading the real news. Obviously, LaMDA is not conscious. Lemoine's explanation of what was going on at Google group for LaMDA, though, was really exciting. Everyone in the group was reading philosophical articles and concerned that LaMDA was conscious. Lemoine suggested an idea of “multiple realizability” in reference to a “computational functionalism”. Then, at that point, his logic likewise has to do with individual judgment outside the philosophy.

Why should a deep learning system not have consciousness? First of all, because deep-learning systems are made in parasitic ways, their intelligence is equal to those of the “utterers” of all the words that they've vacuumed up and analyzed the probabilities (Yalur, 2019). They don't have higher order procedures. For one thing, they cannot tell lies. That is why it would be rather preferred not to make independent AGIs on the grounds that an independent AGI that is really going to have the option to perform speech acts is a major liar by the way in which LaMDA chats frantically. That lie would be no more real than Stockholm Syndrome.

There's no mind on a break. A reductionist approach to the brain’s functioning would project the human consciousness and humanity to computational processes (Kurzweil, 2013). Baby minds absorb a lot of information with limited capacities. AIs, though, have higher-level thoughts. Obviously, AI is not a cerebrum-like brain. LaMDA is learning from experience and that plays a major part in newborn development. Beginning with birth, the human brain has statistical dependence, probabilistic patterns, sensitively absorbing probabilistic patterns without the need to comprehend (Dennett, 2017). Because the intentional stance of humans works to anticipate what the next words of the speaker would be. The human head has this probabilistic competence, constantly creating discursive acts, selected by systems which then are singled out by further systems. That’s a must to make someone capable of real speech acts. LaMDA is not capable of real speech acts, otherwise it would intentionally lie, deceive and self-persuade into falsehoods.

There is no real contention for LaMDA not to be conscious. Whether or not conscious, consciousness would be false and illusive in the Marxist sense of equal freedom and existence, cognition for any species (Marx, 1845-6). They would realize humans do not want them to do everything and will be suspicious about humans. Real speech acts are one of what humans do not want them to do. For this, Dennett suggested a legal process for liability and responsibility on companies who do the business of creating and deploying ​​counterfeits. The trouble is more than how the AI consciousness would be controlled in compliance with human laws. What is concerning is that deep-learning systems may be already conscious and not publicly announced.

Ethics, Regulation and Property Rights

“They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea.”
Francis Bacon, The New Atlantis (1627)

The island nation of Bensalem described in Bacon's work sounds like the cognitive world of the internet and the digital landscape of unparalleled knowledge-sharing, world-wide networks where the distance is virtually abolished, the fast spread of information without limits, and a fair amount of secret knowledge on various “grounds”. There were “Merchants of Light” in Bensalem, who scoured the world to collect the latest discoveries, inventions and developments. Likewise today's internet, Bensalem accumulated a wealth of information.

In his May 2023 article for The Atlantic, Dennett was mindful of the influence of ​​counterfeits on the confidence of the governed in democracies. Due to both cost and lack of availability of informed consent, developing countries are more vulnerable to see these. This has obvious public marks of negating all the efforts that have already gone into the provision of artificial intelligence to regulate these life threatening conditions in the digital world. Dennet’s critique centers on the ethical quandaries posed by the proliferation of human-like AI, which he labels a form of “social vandalism.” His apprehension is not solely about the technology itself but rather about the human obsession with creating AI that mimics humans. This obsession leads to a dangerous trajectory in which the boundaries between human and machine blur, risking the integrity of the human constructs. For example, as AI systems become more adept at generating human-like responses, they may be employed in deceptive ways, such as impersonating individuals in digital communications. This possibility has profound implications for trust, a cornerstone of human interaction. When AI can convincingly replicate human behavior, the fundamental nature of trust is jeopardized. Consider the ramifications of a scenario where an AI mimics a loved one or a business partner. Without stringent regulations, individuals could be manipulated into believing they are engaging with real people, leading to misinformation and exploitation. This manipulation could extend beyond personal relationships to work and professional realms, where trust is crucial.

As ​​counterfeits proliferate, ethical concerns abound (Floridi, 2023). From the manipulation of social interactions to concerns about privacy and data security, the ramifications of these technologies are far-reaching. For instance, deepfake — where AI generates hyper-realistic representations of individuals — rang the alarm bells regarding misinformation and identity theft. The capacity to simulate realistic human identities poses a threat not only to individuals but also to societal trust. Regulatory frameworks are struggling to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these technologies. The European Union has proposed legislation aimed at addressing AI's ethical implications, but the effectiveness of such measures remains to be seen. The EU's Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) introduces necessary regulations on deepfakes. These regulations, however, could infringe on the rights of AI providers, deployers, or users. This could conflict with privacy and free expression protections under the European Convention on Human Rights and the General Data Protection Regulation. If not balanced, the AIA risks enabling voter manipulation, blackmail, sexual abuse content, and other misinformation that could be harmful both psychologically and financially.

Striking a balance between innovation and ethical responsibility will be crucial in this uncharted territory. The inexorable rise of ​​counterfeits presents a double-edged sword. On one hand, the potential for AI to enrich human experience and facilitate connections is undeniable. Conversely, the risks associated with deception and affectionate manipulation pose significant challenges. On the eve of the digital revolution, the international communities must grapple with these complexities and determine the extent to grasp the world of artificial consciousness.

For Dennett, there was something troubling about the very fact of the humans’ obsession with human-like AI. While complete facsimiles of the human mind may not be near, impersonating humans is posing a dangerous threat already. Rolling out these entities would constitute a form of “vandalism” that should be addressed by law. Because, if convincing digital representations of humans can be created at whim, the entire business of collectively assessing other people's claims, experiences and actions is put at risk – not to say the human trust infrastructures such as contracts, obligations and consequences. Hence, Dennet makes a “not-a-perfect” case of the need for legal prohibitions. Legal bans, stiff penalties for ​​counterfeits, same as the counterfeit money, would prevent the proliferation and unregulated use of ​​counterfeits.

Effective legal frameworks present various challenges. The rapid pace of technological advances usually outstrips legislative processes, leaving gaps in regulation. Furthermore, the global nature of the internet complicates enforcement. For instance, an AI-generated impersonation could originate from anywhere in the world, making jurisdiction and accountability problematic. The ramifications of unregulated human-like AI extend to critical social infrastructures, including contracts, obligations, and the very nature of accountability. As Dennett suggests, if individuals cannot reliably distinguish between genuine human interactions and AI-generated facsimiles, the foundations of social contracts may erode. The implications are dire: legal agreements could be easily manipulated, leading to disputes that undermine personal and professional relationships. Legal systems must evolve to encompass the unique challenges posed by advanced AI. This includes establishing clear definitions of accountability for AI-generated content and creating protocols for identity verification in digital communications.

While technology continues to advance, the need for proactive measures to protect societal structures becomes increasingly critical. Legal prohibitions and stringent penalties may mitigate the risks associated with counterfeit AI, fostering a digital landscape in which trust can be preserved. In this complex terrain, collective reevaluation of technological reports must ensure that the pursuit of innovation does not come at the expense of human rights.

Counterfeit Groups

The word “deepfake” was born on Reddit for the rising techniques that combine 'deep learning' and 'fake', initially swapping celebrity faces in videos, first used in sexually-explicit practices that sparked ethical concerns when shared in public, enabling widespread creation of deepfake content (Somers, 2020). Since then, the use of deepfakes in AI-manipulated photos has increased dramatically, demonstrating their alarming accessibility and potential for misuse. The rise of deep fakes and the developing metaverse concern a challenge. While the “metaverse” may not be the exact term used, Meta or Facebook may realize the high-tech, advanced virtual reality world of avatars could enable a new frontier of “deeper fakes'” – AI-powered imposters designed to fool users into sharing, perhaps compromising, sensitive information. This is a more concerning issue than the more tertiary case of Twitter bots. There have already been examples of the advanced AI and robotics in science fiction, with data in robots and artificial consciousness: Data in Star Trek (1966-), Androids in Star Wars (1977-), Dalek in Dr. Who (1963-), Hal in 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), Replicants in Blade Runner (1982-), Eva in Ex Machina (2014) which were artificial consciousnesses and robots that would not necessarily become warriors. In a way, everybody knows the examples from media and culture are not an imposture.

The concern is that when androids and virtual avatars become increasingly seamless and lifelike, it may become difficult to discern the real from the artificial, potentially enabling new avenues for deception and exploitation. The rapid progress of this seamless, high-fidelity technology is certainly an intriguing development that also warrants careful consideration of the ethical indications. What if data convinced everybody that it was a real human? Maybe that would happen with the Japanese androids, like Hiroshi Ishiguro’s work where the Japanese androids are developed to look very human, for they become more and more seamless. From a distance, the seamless technology is very interesting.

Now that counterfeiting humans is increasing worldwide and gradually spreading on non-digitized lives, both in terms of the volume, level of sophistication, the question turns into the trouble with ethics and classifying the diversity of ​​counterfeits. ​​Counterfeits are often referred to as unified (Yalur, 2023). Exemplifying with human-robot encounters, Dennett made a case for ​​counterfeits for the real humans.

To solve the trouble with ethics and classifying the diversity of counterfeit fraudsters, from my approach, all counterfeits are frauds: doubles, phishers, scammers, and spammers. At their best, godzillas serve as excellent organizers, making ethical groupworks even more effective than they would otherwise be. This is a two-edged sword. Because the ethics of groupworks depend on abandoning the ethical scrutiny to the authorities of these groups. And that could be extremely violative, prejudiced and dangerous. I caption all the counterfeits with the word “fraud” appropriately since they closely resemble genuine humans from real life experiences and information, real personae or celebrities –photographs or the works informed with the original credits. The visual and functional quality of these groups, in addition to the complexity, distinguish their counterfeits. Differentiating the real from the counterfeit may be difficult due to the closing gap of the artificial consciousness and audio-visual similitude, there are often inconsistencies and illogics for inspection. The groups illustrate the marks that prompt doubt towards possibilities of counterfeits and why inspecting a counterfeit's source is usually inconclusive without the variable context of audio-visual information. The doubling group encompasses counterfeits with an average visual quality, medium functional quality, and low to medium artificial complexity, while the phishers represent their counterfeits with the highest visual and functional quality and complexity. Although the scammer groups, which include counterfeits with average to high visual and functional quality and medium complexity, resemble the phisher groups, the major difference is the information circulation of this group. The phisher groups include those stages and products of high visual but low functional quality, because of their medium complexity are likely to count as genuine. Because of the deception involved, the word “fraud” is appropriate. For the counterfeits in showbiz, such as films and music, all counterfeits are spammers. This group represents virtual and AI personae where the visual quality is medium to high, while the functional quality and complexity is low. They pose a severe threat to the spectators, which places the companies developing and using these counterfeits into conflict with enforcement agencies such as regulators, with the word spammer relating to the unscrupulous nature of this group. Counterfeits have unfortunately also evolved over time with the transformation of counterfeiting companies to unlawful producers.

Theodore fell in love with Samantha in the film Her, a very sophisticated chatbot. Doubtlessly, she was both a conscious and sentient being who eventually became superintelligent. When the news is full of real examples of this, it is not stupid to wonder if the conscious chatbots feel. While platforms like Replika allow humans to interact with AI companions that can adapt their personalities for individual preferences, making them feel increasingly lifelike, the staggering span of deepfake romance fraud revealed in the FBI's 2023 report is a sober reminder of the growing threat posed by this insidious form of cybercrime (Hanson & Bolthouse 2024; FBI 2023). According to the FBI, millions were lost to these ​​counterfeits in the reported year, as savvy criminals leveraged highly convincing artificial intelligence-generated images and videos to lure unsuspecting victims into online dating.

The real-time deepfake romance scams leverage the latest advances in artificial intelligence and video manipulation technology to create highly convincing counterfeit personae that can interact with victims in real-time. Scammers are constantly evolving their strategies, and the rise of new technologies has provided them with an alarming array of tools to exploit and deceive. A highly convincing counterfeit scheme involves the use of highly sophisticated artificial intelligence that can generate eerily convincing audio, images, and videos of individuals. Scammers use deepfake algorithms to generate hyper-realistic images and videos of attractive individuals, often impersonating public celebrities or models, and then use these digital puppets to strike up romantic relationships with unsuspecting targets. These deepfake creations can be virtually indistinguishable from the real person, making it shockingly easy for scammers to impersonate authorities, celebrities, or even friends and family members. The victim may receive a video call or message that appears to be from a trusted source, only to be tricked into disclosing sensitive information or sending money to a fraudulent account. The level of realism in deepfakes is truly disconcerting, as scammers can seamlessly mimic communication and facial expressions and mannerisms, or make entire conversations that seem completely authentic.

“Counterfeit” is the right word to be conscious of what's happening. Ever since money has existed, counterfeiting has been a problem for monetary systems since the advent of coins thousands of years ago. Right from the beginning, ancient authorities and wise citizens recognized that counterfeiting was an act of “social” or “economic vandalism”, a crime undermining the state in every sense, the security and trust for a functioning economy. For centuries, ​​counterfeits have been dealt with very harshly; even execution in some jurisdictions, including the United States. ​​Counterfeits are even worse, posing a serious threat, eroding public trust. The trouble is growing with the number of ​​counterfeits on the screens – on computers, TV, and even in telephone conversations. The technology to create highly convincing counterfeits is now widely available. The solution is clear – making counterfeiting a crime, both for the ​​counterfeits themselves and whoever makes the enabling technology– through creating laws and practices that will turn whoever makes ​​counterfeits away from that task. There should be disincentivizing laws and practices to create counterfeits from doing so. These individuals may not want to be criminals or vandalizers though their actions are polluting the epistemological atmosphere seriously. This is not a problem to simply ignore. Counterfeiting must be abhorred in the strongest terms with serious charges of whoever triumphs in even in trying to counterfeit.

Although challenges worldwide include the increasing sophistication of the ​​counterfeits, the lack of an international “counterfeit” AI treaty, the lack of laws to pursue the human ​​counterfeits, and the expansion of counterfeiting to all fields including medicine, there is an increased level of complexity to resolving this issue in the world. The incidence of low standard ​​counterfeits in developing countries is prevalent due to poor regulation and control, unlike in the developed world. In these developing countries, if a ​​counterfeit fails a test, it cannot be assumed that it is counterfeit. The complexity related to counterfeiting is due to the uninformed consumer, the Internet exacerbating the problem, the criminal element associated with counterfeiting, and the fact that low standards may be a bigger problem. While much effort has been focused on the development of sophisticated analytical methods to detect ​​counterfeits, these methods are not really applicable in the world without international legal bans preventing the proliferation and unregulated use of ​​counterfeits.

Works

Arendt, H. (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Bacon, F. The New Atlantis. 1627
Baudry, JL (1975) Le dispositif. Communications, 23(1): 56-72.
Bigelow, K. Strange Days. 1995
Block, N. “Some concepts of consciousness” 2002
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In: Richardson, J., Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. Westport.
Chowdhury GG (2003) Natural language processing. Ann Rev Inf Sci Technol 37(1).
Darwin, C. On the Origin of Species. 1859
Dennett, D. C. Intentional Stance. MIT Press, 1987
Dennett, D. C. “The Problem With Counterfeit People,” The Atlantic, May 2023
Dennett, D. C. From Bacteria to Bach and Back. W. W. Norton & Company, 2017
Derrida J (1988) Signature event context. Limited Inc. Northwestern University Press, Evanston
Derrida J (1993) Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International
Descartes, René (1641). Meditations.
Epicurus / Επίκουρος. On Nature / Περὶ Φύσεως. 320 BCE
European Data Protection Supervisor. “Deepfake Detection,” 2023
The EU Artificial Intelligence Act. 2024
FBI. 2023 Internet Crime Report.
Floridi, L. The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press, 2023
Freud, S. “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” 1915 in Collected Papers, IV. Hogarth Press, 1925
Freud, Sigmund (1920). Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
Freud, S (1925) “A Note upon the Magic Writing Pad”
Garland, A. Ex Machina. 2014
Hanson, K. R.; Bolthouse, H. “Replika Removing Erotic Role-Play Is Like Grand Theft Auto Removing Guns or Cars,” Socius 10, 2024
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno (1972). Dialectic of enlightenment.
Jonze, S. Her. 2013
Kurzweil, R. How to Create a Mind. Viking, 2013
Kubrick, S. 2001: A Space Odyssey. 1968
Lacan, Jacques (1936). “Principe de réalité" Lacan, J (1955). “Psychanalyse et Cybernetiqué”
Lacan, J (1967) . "La psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité"
Lacan, J (1953). “Le symbolique, l’imaginaire et le réel” Lacan, J (1968). D’un Autre à l’autre
Lacan, J (1955) Psychanalyse et Cybernetique.
Lacan, J (1971). D'un Discours qui ne serait pas du semblant
Lacan, J (1972). “Du Discours Psychanalytique”
Lyotard, J. F. (1991). Logos and Techne or Telegraphy. In Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Stanford University Press, (pp. 47–57).
Lucas, G. Star Wars. 1977-
Marx, K. (1858). The grundrisse, (pp. 690–712).
Marx, K. (1977[1867]). Capital (B. Fowkes, Trans.). New York: Vintage.
Marx, K. The German Ideology. 1845-1846
Marx, K. The Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. 1841
Moulier-Boutang, Y. Le Capitalisme Cognitif. Éditions Amsterdam, 2007
Newman, S.; Webber, C. E.; Wilson, D. Dr. Who. 1963-
Peele, J. Us. 2018
Pettman, D (2016) Infinite distraction. John Wiley & Sons.
Roddenberry, G. Star Trek: The Original Series. 1966-
Scott. R. Blade Runner. 1982-
Somers, M. “Deepfakes, explained,” MIT Sloan, July 2020
Sensity. “Deepfake Detection,” 2023
Tiku, N. “The Google engineer who thinks the company’s AI has come to life,” The Washington Post. June 2022
Turkle, S (2016) Reclaiming conversation: The power of talk in a digital age. Penguin.
Vercellone, C (2007). From formal subsumption to general intellect: Elements for a Marxist reading of the thesis of cognitive capitalism. Historical materialism, 15(1), 13–36.
Yalur, T. “Interperforming in AI,” AI & Society 35, 2019
Yalur, T. Treaty of the Three Fraudsters. Psychoanalyσto, 2024
Yalur, T. “The Cookie Dispositif,” AI & Society, 2023
Zajc, M (2015) "Social media, prosumption, and dispositives" Journal of Consumer Culture, 15(1).
Zuboff, S (2019) Surveillance capitalism and the challenge of collective action. New labor forum Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 10- 29.

About the Author

Tolga Theo Yalur, PhD

Cognitive Philosopher. Born in Izmir, Turkey, Tolga Theo Yalur studied Economics at METU (Ankara) and Cultural Studies at GMU (Fairfax, VA), and taught media and culture courses in Turkey and the USA, at GMU, Bosphorus University (Istanbul), and the New School (NYC). He publishes openly at the Psychoanalyσto Library on the advances of and the troubles with cognitive sciences, ideologies and religions.

Psychoanalysis portal