Talk:Deterrence

Effective Deterrence

DETERRENCE

The definition of "deterrence" given by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is: "The prevention from action by fear of the Consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction." The "counteraction" could take the form of a credible threat of unacceptable damage in the event of enemy attack or the credible threat of defeating an enemy in combat should the enemy attack. Both types of counter-threats can be carried out by conventional forces, nuclear forces or some combination of the two. In WW-II strategic bombing by the Allies in Europe destroyed virtually everything worth destroying in Germany, which greatly assisted the Allied victory. In the Pacific Theater, a combination of strategic bombing and combat actions destroyed the Japanese Navy and many Japanese cities. However, in neither Theater did the enemy surrender until, in Europe, Allied forces (including the Red Army) finally closed in on Berlin and, in the Pacific, the US employed nuclear weapons to convince Japanese leaders that an invasion of the Home Islands would not be necessary in order to obliterate the Japanese nation. Since WW-II only the threat of nuclear retaliation has been successful in accomplishing pre-war deterrence.

A good example of how nuclear forces can effect deterrence where conventional forces cannot is the relationship between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have been in conflict ever since the partition of British India in 1947. They fought 3 wars against each other, all of which India won. Indeed, in the 3rd India-Pakistan war, India dismembered Pakistan. Indian forces conquered what was then "East Pakistan" and turned it into a new country; Bangladesh. India performed its first nuclear weapon test in 1974. At that point the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, declared that Pakistan would achieve nuclear weapon status "If we have to eat grass."

Pakistan performed its first nuclear weapon test in May, 1998 by detonating 5 nuclear weapons. This was in answer to India's detonation of 5 weapons 2 weeks earlier. So, in 1998 both of these rivals (not just one) had developed nuclear weapon capability. Interestingly, there has never been another India-Pakistan war. This has not been because Pakistan's army has dramatically increased its conventional capabilities. India's army could still make short work of Pakistan's army. But, should India attempt this it would lead inevitably to the destruction of several major Indian cities. The threat of this level of damage to its cities has resulted not only in no further wars, but also some significant improvements in relations between India and Pakistan. In other words, the development of nuclear weapons by BOTH sides in this conflict has not only frozen the situation into peace, but also forced these 2 countries to actually talk to one another.--Dr of Econ (discuss • contribs) 14:43, 2 November 2018 (UTC) 2 NOV, 2018, 10:40 AM, EDT

Another, better known example of deterrence is the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the past, a number of wars have been fought between Israel and a coalition of Arab states (usually including at least Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan). Israel was able to win these wars due to a combination of Israel's expertise in strategy, tactics, operations and leadership. However, Israel's senior leaders, both political and military, knew that this superiority could not last forever. The Israelis knew that, given enough time, the Arabs might well come close to being able to approach the capabilities of the IDF in these critical areas. As a result Israel's leaders knew that, if they wanted to save their country from the Arab objective of "pushing the Jews into the sea," they would have to develop the "ultimate" deterrent: nuclear forces. There are various estimates regarding when, exactly, Israel developed its first usable nuclear weapons. It may have been as early as 1969 or as late as 1972. However, we do know that, in a meeting between then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and then US President Richard Nixon, Nixon pressured Meir to not make public any nuclear capabilities that Israel developed. We also know that Israel consciously refused to sign up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This left Israel with the ability to develop nuclear weapons legally.

The last major war between Israel and its Arab enemies took place in 1973 (commonly known as "The Yom-Kippur War." This war included, on the Arab side, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia, Sudan and Morocco (the "usual suspects"++). The leaders of these countries believed that they could win this war and accomplish their long-sought goal of "pushing the Jews into the sea" because they had recently received large deliveries of the latest Soviet weapons including tanks, aircraft and ANTI-tank missiles. They had also, possibly with the aid of Soviet advisors, figured out a way to breach the so-called "Bar Lev Line" - a string of fortifications along the eastern side of the Suez canal. The Arab military leaders counted on the fact that, since it was Yom-Kippur, most Israeli soldiers would be on leave with their families and, as a result, this defense line would only be lightly defended. The Arab intelligence services also ran a very effective "deception operation" designed to mask the Soviet arms shipments, hide their military buildup and convince Israeli leaders that an attack was NOT imminent.

When the Arabs DID attack they took Israel's leaders by complete surprise. Many high ranking Israeli commanders, as well as Prime Minister Meir believed that Israel was on the verge of being destroyed. However, unfortunately for the Arab leaders, Israel was, by then, in possession of a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. So, the Israeli leaders, while immediately calling up reserves, also prepared their nuclear weapons for use against the attacking Arab forces. Fortunately, the Israeli army, now bolstered by reserves, was able to retake the Golan Heights (as a result of which the Syrian commander of their tank army committed suicide) and, in addition, not only stopped the Egyptian advance but also encircled the Entire Egyptian 3rd Army, crossed the Suez Canal and advanced toward Cairo. (Incidentally, the commander of the Israeli forces that accomplished the canal crossing was a then little-known armored division commander named Ariel Sharon, who would later become Israel's Prime Minister.) After the '73 war it became widely known that Israel has a significant nuclear arsenal deliverable by both land-based missiles (including some that can reach Russia) as well as Sea-Launched-Cruise-Missiles (SLCM) based on submarines. And, not only has there never been another Arab-Israeli war, but a number of Arab Nations have begun to actually normalize relations with the Jewish state including Egypt, which signed a neutrality pact with Israel. Another achievement for nuclear deterrence.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE

Another aspect of deterrence which many people do not understand is the concept of "extended deterrence." Extended deterrence refers to one party's use of its nuclear forces to "extend" its nuclear deterrent to cover its allies. For example, the US uses its nuclear deterrent forces to "extend" deterrence to its NATO allies. It should be obvious that extended deterrence may be seen, by potential aggressors, as not entirely credible. After all, extended deterrence requires the aggressor to believe that the nuclear-armed nation's leaders will use its nuclear forces against a potentially nuclear-armed aggressor on behalf of its allies when they are attacked. The solution to this problem, at least for NATO, has been the use of "coupling mechanisms" which, hopefully, will convince, say, Russia's leaders, that the US will use its nuclear forces in the event that those Russian leaders decide to mount an overwhelming conventional attack on, say, Germany. One such mechanism is to deploy a large number of US conventional forces on German soil, thus ensuring that US conventional forces will suffer major losses in any war that involves a Russian invasion of Germany. At the height of the Cold War, the US stationed roughly 300,000 troops (army and air force)in Europe and, especially, in W. Germany. In addition, the British army also had a large number of troops in W. Germany. US forces were mostly in the south, to guard against a likely route of attack called "The Fulda Gap." The British forces were in the north, guarding another likely route of attack, "The North German Plain," which happens to be pretty good tank country (and the Soviets had thousands of them. The Russians have fewer, but still quite an impressive number). Today the number of US troops in Europe is around 30,000, still enough to produce very large US casualties in the event of war in order to justify nuclear use by the US.

Another coupling mechanism which NATO has employed in the past is US tactical and Theater nuclear weapons deployed on European soil. These are low-yield weapons for use in combat. These weapons were of three general types. First, there were "Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles" (or, AFAPS). These weapons were of very low yield as they were for use at the Brigade or Division level. Second, there were slightly longer range SSMs used as Corps Support Weapons. The most modern of these weapons was the Lance missile (since discarded by . This missile could be armed with a conventional warhead which could be used for "bunker busting." It could also be armed with a nuclear warhead which had a variable yield from 1 - 100 Kilotons (that is, the maximum yield of the warhead on this missile was equivalent of 100 thousand tons of TNT). In addition, this missile could be armed with an Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW), sometimes called a "neutron bomb" by the ignorant. The purpose of this weapon was NOT, as Soviet propaganda had it, "to kill people but leave property intact - the perfect capitalist weapon." Rather, the fact that it produced a large amount of radiation but a relatively small blast effect made it "perfect" for destroying Russian tank columns while leaving German VILLAGES intact. This weapon was not only deployed by the US. It was also, as we say, "organic" to other NATO armies including the British, the Germans, the Belgians, the Dutch and the Italians. The US supplied the nuclear components of this missile to these allied armies (except the British)under what was called a "dual-key system" in which the use of the nuclear-armed versions of the Lance required the concurrence of both the American Commander and the allied (say, the Belgian or Dutch) commander. Unfortunately, because President Carter fell for the Soviet propaganda line, the ER warhead for the Lance was not deployed in Europe until he left office in 1981, when President Reagan took office and ordered the ER version of the Lance warhead (as well as ER versions of some artillery shells) to be deployed. Also unfortunately, Carter's last minute decision to not deploy the ER version of the Lance missile, as well as ER versions of some artillery shells destroyed the political career of German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who had gone out on a political limb by announcing, before Carter's loss of nerve, that he would accept the ER versions of various weapons for deployment on German soil. Schmidt had been a long-time supporter of the US and the improvement of NATO's tactical nuclear forces as he had served as Minister of Defense before becoming Chancellor.--Dr of Econ (discuss • contribs) 23:20, 2 November 2018 (UTC)Michael F. Altfeld, Ph.D., NOV 2, 2018, 1815, EST. ing

The purpose of NATO's tactical nuclear forces (on missiles, aircraft and naval vessels) is to provide "escalation control." These forces provide an alternative to immediately using strategic nuclear forces against numerous targets within the Soviet Union/Russia. Thus, if the Soviets/Russians were to invade NATO-Europe with massive conventional forces, NATO would first try to redress the situation conventionally. However, should conventional defense fail, NATO would then employ its tactical nuclear forces against Soviet/Russian forces. Of course, the Soviets/Russians had/have their own tactical nuclear forces (on missiles and aircraft) with which to retaliate in order to restore their superiority. Indeed, if the Soviets/Russians were to have intelligence suggesting that NATO was about to "go nuclear," they might even use their tactical nuclear forces preemptively in order to (among other things) disarm NATO of its nuclear forces. And, since the Soviets/Russians had/have gross numerical superiority over NATO in this area they could afford large-scale strikes against suspected NATO nuclear weapons sites without depleting their inventory. This has been a continuing problem for NATO. NATO has attempted to ameliorate this problem by dispersing its tactical nuclear forces over many artillery units, air-bases and some secret locations for its Lance missiles.

Unfortunately, however, in 1991, the entire concept of Escalation Control was demolished by Bush the elder who ordered the UNILATERAL removal of all US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. And, in addition, the dismantling of these weapons so they could never be re-deployed again. This amounted to the self-destruction of NATO's "Escalation Ladder." And, while Gorbachev made promises to do likewise, there were NO inspection requirements. Further, in 1992, Bush the elder made additional,UNILATERAL cuts in US Strategic nuclear forces.

It turns out that Bush's unilateral cuts, made in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, were extremely short-sighted. The Soviet Union did collapse. But, that did not mean that Russia would never recover. Since Putin was elected, these "unilateral" Soviet cuts (if they ever existed at all) were rejected by Russia which then began a truly massive nuclear buildup.

Another method by which NATO has attempted to achieve escalation control has been to "raise the nuclear threshold." That is, NATO has attempted, by fielding new, non-nuclear weapons, to dramatically increase the lethality (NOT a misspelling) of its "conventional" forces. Unfortunately, this strategy turned out to be completely ineffective and, perhaps, even dangerous. NATO commanders (and their political masters) discovered this when East Germany collapsed. When it did so, the Warsaw Pact war-plans were obtained. These plans involved orders from Moscow that required that their forces immediately "go nuclear" in the event that their attack on NATO Europe got "bogged down." Thus, there was never any interest, by Soviet/Russian leaders (military or political), in trying to keep a war in Europe conventional. Their plan was to WIN and to do so whatever it took.--Dr of Econ (discuss • contribs) 13:17, 5 November 2018 (UTC)Michael F. Altfeld, Ph.D.

THE ENEMY RESPONSE

Just as NATO has used "coupling mechanisms" to ensure that the US would have to become involved in any war between the Soviet Union/Russia and NATO Europe, the Soviets/Russians have employed several methods designed to DEcouple Europe from the US in order to achieve Soviet/Russian domination of NATO Europe and isolate the US from its European allies. These methods have involved espionage, economic warfare and military actions. With respect to espionage, the KGB adopted a strategy of "Active Measures." This strategy involved recruiting high-level European politicians whom the KGB paid to write, speak and perform other actions that would advance Soviet/Russian interests. These people were known as "Agents of Influence." Some of them stuck to "Influence Operations." Others, however, engaged in both influencing public attitudes toward the Soviets/Russians in their home countries while, in addition, becoming spies.

One of the best examples of this strategy was Arne Treholt. Treholt was a Norwegian Labor Party politician and Diplomat. He was also a member of the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs as well as being a journalist for a major Norwegian newspaper. The KGB paid Treholt tens of thousands of dollars. In return, Treholt used his positions not only to "play down" the Soviet threat, but also to commit outright acts of espionage. Treholt wrote slanted newspaper articles apologizing for the Soviets' actions. In addition, Treholt provided the Soviets and Iraqis with top secret Norwegian/NATO documents. He was arrested in 1964 and sentenced to 20 years in a maximum security prison. However, he was released after only 8 years and then moved to the Soviet Union.

With regard to "Economic Warfare," a good example of this approach has been the continuing attempt to make Western Europe dependent on the Soviets/Russians for their supplies of oil and natural gas. The logic of this approach is simple. The more dependent Western Europe becomes on the Soviets/Russians for critical energy resources, the easier it becomes for the Soviets/Russians to coerce the NATO nations into not opposing Soviet/Russian actions which violate International Law in general and, in specific, loosen their ties with the US.

The military approach to decoupling NATO Europe from the US is fairly straightforward. This involves the Soviet/Russian efforts to become grossly numerically superior to the Armies of the NATO European nations as well as the US forces stationed in Europe. This was done, under the Soviets, by the production of an enormous number of "Tank Armies," the previously mentioned establishment of a massive arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, and an extraordinarily large number of aircraft (including both air-to-air fighters and close-air-support "attack aircraft"). The point of this build-up was to convince the leaders of the European NATO countries that, in the event of war, Soviet forces would win faster than the US could mobilize its forces and convoy them to Europe. The political purpose of this military build-up was to make the leaders of NATO European nations more willing to accept Soviet actions which were of questionable legality, if not direct violations of international treaties and/or international law.

The US attempted to counter Soviet attempts to gain military domination over Europe by, among other things, positioning the equipment for ten divisions in western portions of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG; aka West Germany). Thus, in the event of a crisis, the US would only have to airlift the personnel for those divisions to the FRG. These personnel would then only have to "fall in" on the weapons and vehicles that would be waiting for them. The ultimate objective was to have 10 combat divisions available for action within 10 days. The US/NATO also had other ways of coping with Soviet efforts to achieve military dominance over NATO Europe. (more later)--Dr of Econ (discuss • contribs) 19:13, 11 November 2018 (UTC)Michael F. Altfeld 11 NOV, 2018, 1410 EST

(more later)--Dr of Econ (discuss • contribs) 12:12, 10 November 2018 (UTC)Michael F. Altfeld, Ph.D., 10 NOV, 2018, 0710 EST

(more later)--Dr of Econ (discuss • [[Special:Contributions/Dr of Econ|contribNovember 2018 (UTC)the Soviet Union

 (more later)--Dr of Econ (discuss • contribs) 10:48, 9 November 2018 (UTC)Michael F. Altfeld, Ph.D., 9 NOV, 2018.

(more later)--Dr of Econ (discuss • contribs) 08:32, 9 November 2018 (UTC)Michael F. Altfeld, Ph.D. 9 NOV, 2018

Dr of Econ (discuss • contribs) 15:55, 3 November 2018 (UTC)Michael F.Altfeld, Ph.D. 3 NOV, 4:54 (EST)

2A02:8388:E201:4C80:E501:2BE:94A:CE3E (discuss) 22:18, 31 October 2018 (UTC) 17:15, 31 OCT, 2018 but

11:46, 31 October 2018 (UTC)Michael F. Altfeld, Ph.D. 31 OCT, 2018, 0645 EST.

@Dr of Econ: This is good information. Please enhance the resource. Be bold! -- Dave Braunschweig (discuss • contribs) 12:31, 31 October 2018 (UTC)