- 1 Symbology
- 2 Humanic Manifesto
- 3 History
- 3.1 Overview
- 3.2 1923 Ogden
- 3.3 1930
- 3.4 1930 Ogden
- 3.5 1933 Korzybski
- 3.6 1936 Richards
- 3.7 1938 Wells
- 3.8 1939 Bernal
- 3.9 1940 Huxley
- 3.10 1945 Bush
- 3.11 1948 Shannon
- 3.12 1948 Wiener
- 3.13 1957
- 3.14 1957 Cherry
- 3.15 1960 Quine
- 3.16 1975
- 3.17 1975 Kolb
- 3.18 1976
- 3.19 1976 Chisholm
- 3.20 1977
- 3.21 1977 Popper
- 3.22 1984
- 3.23 1986 Carr
- 3.24 1995 Nonaka
- 4 Gallery
- 5 Hot spots
- 6 Pages
- 7 Subpages
- 8 WMF
- 9 References
The encoder encodes what is to be coded into the codes. Then the decoder decodes them hopefully back to the coded, however well the latter may fit the former.
The above diagram is to show, so to speak, the quadrant brain (qb) coding cycle, or ⊂qb⊃. The left and right hemispheres thereof may well relate to symbolism and realism, respectively, vitally separated and bridged by truism.
Julian Jayne's bicameralism (1976) may be another, rather simpler mode of presentation, focusing on the upper and lower, the encoder and decoder, the "master" and "slave" [Notes 1] hemispheres, also vitally separated and bridged by inter-subjectivity.
Symbolism, relying on coding or informing, is not so much trans-forming from code to code wholly explicitly or physically, on the "technical" level, as in-forming or making the implicit explicit logically, whether knowing or feeling, on the "semantic" and "pragmatic" levels.[Notes 2] Hence, it is properly the cognitive rather than cognitivist, the humanic rather than dehumanizing or personalizing realm.
Claude Shannon's information theory (1948) basically has to do with the physical coding and recording, the carrier or container of information, but without regard to the logical content or meaning, whether feeling or learning. Hence, his radically partial notion of information and transformation from code to code, given and taken wholly explicitly, totally regardless of what is deeply and complicatedly implicated, that is, my invested interest! What an injustice his flood would do! What a fool, if not pirate, as well as hero his foolish followers may make of him!
A Category Mistake?
- Confusing Containers and Contents
The innate or inherited capacity of learning, say, how to speak would better be distinguished from the acquired capability or knowledge of speaking, say, English.
The long-running arguments against the erased, blank slate or tabula rasa, especially ranging a half century from Noam Chomsky (1959) to Steven Pinker (2002), are too foolish to distinguish the container from the content of experience and learning. So are librarians more often than not, who used to mistake their books (containers under control) for "recorded knowledge" (contents under control). What a category mistake!
The document retrieval system S is to predict the document(s) D most similar to the user enquiry E, and the user U is to discriminate the outcome.
As the one-to-one-scaled map is impractical and implausible, so may be the full text D for System-User communication S-U so that it used to be necessarily surrogated, say, into an abstract or a set of keywords d.
Nevertheless, such surrogates are mostly too rough for tough interpretation and evaluation enough to assure what the target document is all about.
Behind such blind surrogation, therefore, there must hide or entail such an alternative as "direct manipulation" (Shneiderman, 1983) of the full or partial text -- the criss-cross-referencing hypertext in particular!
And the "direct manipulation" or direct line of interaction S-D-U, would better give way to human-computer interaction (HCI), to be more informative.
Why second-order cybernetics
Any study, as of history, is to make it necessity. The better learned or informed, the better earned earnest of the future. Myths and miracles are unworthy. Then, Karl Popper's anti-historicism is wrong after all.
You are said to be as reasonable as seasonable, as rational as relational or empirical, as deductive as inductive, as analytic as synthetic. This is the very reason or motivation for learning, especially by experience and inference (or reflection, if you like), by inducing or integrating it into a coherent body, context, system, or structure of knowledge, whence you could deduce something at all.
A great deal of attention has been paid . . . to the technical languages in which men of science do their specialized thinking . . . . But the colloquial usages of everyday speech, the literary and philosophical dialects in which men do their thinking about the problems of morals, politics, religion and psychology -- these have been strangely neglected. We talk about "mere matters of words" in a tone which implies that we regard words as things beneath the notice of a serious-minded person.
This is a most unfortunate attitude. For the fact is that words play an enormous part in our lives and are therefore deserving of the closest study. The old idea that words possess magical powers is false; but its falsity is the distortion of a very important truth. Words do have a magical effect -- but not in the way that magicians supposed, and not on the objects they were trying to influence. Words are magical in the way they affect the minds of those who use them. "A mere matter of words," we say contemptuously, forgetting that words have power to mould men's thinking, to canalize their feeling, to direct their willing and acting. Conduct and character are largely determined by the nature of the words we currently use to discuss ourselves and the world around us.
-- Quoted as the opening passage of "BOOK ONE: The Functions of Language" (p. 3) of w: S. I. Hayakawa (1949). Language in Thought and Action.
|V. Bush (1945). "As We May Think"||H. G. Wells (1938). World Brain|
|"Professionally, our methods of transmitting and reviewing the results of research are generations old and by now are totally inadequate for their purpose...The difficulty seems to be not so much that we publish unduly in view of the extent and variety of present-day interests, but rather that publication has been extended far beyond our present ability to make real use of the record."||". . . our contemporary encyclopedias are still in the coach-and-horse phase of development, rather than in the phase of the automobile and the aeroplane. These observers realize that the modern facilities of transport, radio, photographic reproduction and so forth are rendering practicable a much more fully succinct and accessible assembly of facts and ideas than was ever possible before."|
- General communication system? 
- Note how dehumanized this alleged "general communication system" is, as compared with #1948 Wiener.
The odors perceived by the ant seem to lead to a highly standardized course of conduct; but the value of a simple stimulus, such as an odor, for conveying information depends not only on the information conveyed by the stimulus itself but on the whole nervous constitution of the sender and receiver of the stimulus as well. Suppose I find myself in the woods with an intelligent savage who cannot speak my language and whose language I cannot speak. Even without any code of sign language common to the two of us, I can learn a great deal from him. All I need to do is to be alert to those moments when he shows the signs of emotion or interest. I then cast my eyes around, perhaps paying special attention to the direction of his glance, and fix in my memory what I see or hear. It will not be long before I discover the things which seem important to him, not because he has communicated them to me by language, but because I myself have observed them. In other words, a signal without an intrinsic content may acquire meaning in his mind by what he observes at the time, and may acquire meaning in my mind by what I observe at the time. The ability that he has to pick out the moments of my special, active attention is in itself a language as varied in possibilities as the range of impressions that the two of us are able to encompass. Thus social animals may have an active, intelligent, flexible means of communication long before the development of language.
(From VIII. Information, Language, and Society. p. 157.)
- The rise of Sputnik 1
- Word and Object 
- Contextualist themes or memes '75
Percy's psychology delta factor: the irreducible
Kochen's symbology encyclopedia: informed action
Wilson's sociology sociobiology: a new synthesis
- The rise of hacking and the fall of Saigon
Abraham A Linguistic Approach to Metaphor  Buzan mind map  Douglas Implicit Meanings  Fodor Language of Thought  Gadamer Truth and Method  Galtung Peace Research  Grice Implicature  Leavis English as a Discipline of Thought  Kochen From Knowledge to Wisdom  Kolb Experiential Learning  Lasswell informed politics   Leavis English as a Discipline of Thought  Lucas Why Information Systems Fail  Luckmann Sociology of Language  Merton Society for Social Studies of Science  Norman Explorations in Cognition  Pask Conversation, Cognition and Learning  Percy Delta Factor  Piaget Language and Learning  Pocock contextualism  Polanyi Meaning  Putnam The Meaning of 'Meaning'  Rayward The Universe of Information  Ricoeur The Rule of Metaphor  Rumelhart human information processing  Schank episode in memory  Searle Indirect speech acts  Sober Simplicity  Sperber Rethinking Symbolism  Suppes neobehaviorism  Unger Knowledge and Politics   Wilson Sociobiology 
- concrete experience
- observation of and reflection on that experience
- formation of abstract concepts based upon the reflection
- testing the new concepts.
- Person and Object 
- See also
- Ulric Neisser (1976). Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology. WH Freeman.
- Willard Quine (1960). Word and Object.
Popperian cosmology splits the universe into three interacting sub-universes:
- World 1: the world of physical objects and events, including biological entities
- World 2: the world of mental objects and events
- World 3: the world of the products of the human mind
The main argument for the existence of World 2 and World 3 is the direct or indirect causation on World 1.
|theory of meaning||theory of knowledge|
- Spreading the Word 
The crux of their theory, as shown up in the triad, is that language makes no (magic of) meaning in itself or of itself, that is, without the user proper.
|←||3. Abstract |
|→||2. Reflective |
- The diagonal (originally orthogonal) yin and yang such as concrete - abstract, and active - reflective.
- The explicit experiment - experience on the left, and the implicit observation - conception on the right.
- The analogy to the speech act or turn-taking conversation with the speaker on top of the hearer. [Notes 3]
- The analogy to the (qb) model on top.
- Becoming Critical 
- SECI Model 
The Taijitu can be divided into four different parts or quadrants.
- Maybe the hottest
- 1929/Magritte, ie, Magritte, René (1929). The Treachery of Images (La trahison des images). Los Angeles County Museum of Art, Los Angeles, California. [^] -- An entry to a universe of meta-sources for enhancing creative, critical, cryptical thinking, pragmatics or significs over symbolism in the sense of Ogden & Richards (1923).
- World Brain
- wiktionary: User talk:KYPark
|Navigate Books by year|
- John Seely Brown, Allan Collins and Paul Duguid (1989) "Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning." Educational Researcher (Jan-Feb 1989) vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 32-42.  or w:User:KYPark/1989/SCATCOL.
- Jean-Louis Le Moigne (1990). La Modélisation des Systèmes Complexes. Dunod, Paris.
- The year "1973" may be not only mistaken but also deceiving, subtly hanging on either prior or posterior side of the 1975 world brain storming hedge!
- "This following article is of a conversation between Stewart Brand, Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead and was originally published in the CoEvolutionary Quarterly, June 1976, Issue no. 10, pp. 32-44."
- This also stands for computer-human interaction, at least at first!
- C. K. Ogden & I. A. Richards (1923). The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism.
- I. A. Richards (1936). The Philosophy of Rhetoric.
- H. G. Wells (1938). World Brain. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co.
- J. D. Bernal (1939). The Social Function of Science. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Aldous Huxley (1940). Words and Their Meanings.
- Vannevar Bush (1945). "As We May Think," The Atlantic Monthly (July) pp. 101-108. "The article was a reworked and expanded version of his 1939 Mechanization and the Record."
- Claude E. Shannon (1948). "A Mathematical Theory of Communication", Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 27, pp. 379–423, 623-656, July, October, 1948.
- Norbert Wiener (1948). Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine
- Colin Cherry (1957). On Human Communication: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism. The M.I.T. Press.
- Willard Quine (1960). Word and Object.
- David A. Kolb & R. Fry (1975). "Toward an applied theory of experiential learning." in: C. Cooper (ed.) Theories of Group Process, London: John Wiley.
- Roderick Chisholm (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study
- Karl Popper & John C. Eccles (1977). The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism
- Karl Popper (1978). Three Worlds by Karl Popper - The Tanner Lecture on Human Values - Delivered at The University of Michigan on April 7, 1978.
- Karl Popper (1979). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Rev. ed., 1979 (1st ed. 1972)
- Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. (Fig. 1 on page 3)
- David Kolb (1984). Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- W. Carr & S. Kemmis (1986) Becoming Critical. Lewes: Falmer Press.
- Ikujiro Nonaka & Hirotaka Takeuchi (1995). The Knowledge Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press. cf. SECI Model.