Russian Legal System

Russian Communications Laws

The political and technological developments of the post-Soviet era have significantly shaped the current Russian communications law. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began a transition from communism to democracy. This transition also required establishing a new legal regime that adjusted telecommunications and media expectations. In 1991, new foundational laws were adopted with an aim to protect freedom of the press while providing for state oversight over media outlets. The system of communications law within Russia is a culmination of broadcasting, telecommunications, internet governance, and data protection under the domination of federal authority. The constitutional basis for these laws can be found in Articles 29, 71, and 72 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which focus on protecting the right to access and share information while ensuring that the federal government retains the authority to regulate the communications and information security.

At the national level, the Federal Assembly has enacted a series of core statutes such as the Federal Law on Communications and the Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies, and the Protection of Information. As technological developments have expanded and the new telecommunication and media frameworks have emerged, regulation of online content and surveillance has become more prominent. Additional federal law was enacted such as the Yarovaya Amendments and the Sovereign Internet Law that allowed for expanded state powers relating to the developing technologies and implemented priorities of national security into the regulation of the digital environment. Regulatory agencies such as the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media and Roskomnadzor, were responsible for overseeing and implementing the directives of the federal government. At the regional level, constituent entities of the Federation may create their own laws and regulations relating to telecommunications and information governance, however they are restricted to the bounds set by federal law and the supremacy of the Constitution.

Russian communication law is often defined by formal sources of law, but also by the ways in which it governs expression and identity. Russia's communications regime treats information as something that must be protected and controlled, rather than a form of autonomy. Constitutional reforms in 2020 and jurisprudence occurring after Russia's withdrawal from the Council of Europe in 2022 narrows the influence that international human-rights norms have on Russian legislation and regulation. Russia intends to regulate communication that involves political speech, historical truth, cultural and religious expression, unprotected speech, and privacy and data protection. Almost all regulation within Russia operates with the presumption of stability and security justifying the implementation of the regulation with enforcement through strict governance enabled by the state-sponsored surveillance.

Introduction and Sources of Russian Communication Law

National Sources of Russian Communication Law

Russian communication law is dominated by federal laws that were adopted to set out control mechanisms and licensing requirements for providers of telecommunications and information services. Over time, additional laws and amendments were adopted that provided the government with expanded surveillance capabilities and greater ability to control the infrastructure of the internet within Russia. The initial reforms after the collapse of the Soviet Union focused on creating more liberal laws that were intended to offset and remove the focus on censorship to allow for more instances of private media and communications.

Known as the "Mass Media Law", Russian Federal Law No. 2124-1 is a statute that was signed by former President Boris Yeltsin on December 27, 1991. The statute was intended to govern online content regulation while eliminating censorship, creating a private mass media, and establishing journalists' rights amidst the transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the Mass Media Law established principles that introduced the idea of freedom of the press, there have been subsequent amendments that drastically reduced the law's intended effect of establishing more liberal freedoms. The amendments have presented new mandatory registration requirements, strict oversight of any publication that may threaten national security, morality, or public order, and restrictions on content.

The "Sovereign Internet Law" was intended to assist in the establishment of a legal basis for creating a separate segment of the internet to support Russia's desire for information sovereignty. The law intended to introduce a system that allowed for centralized control and monitoring of data and information within Russian borders. It created an internet segment that was intended only for use within Russia and would operate entirely distinct from other global networks. This separate internet segment was entitled "RUnet," and began as the way to refer to resources that were located within Russian domains, however it was soon restricted by Russian legislators to establish a geographically confined network that was subject to the state's authority.

Federal Law No. 374-FZ , known as the "Yarovaya Laws", greatly expanded the government's surveillance powers under the guise of strengthening national security and counterterrorism efforts. Federal Law No. 374-FZ was an effort to facilitate mass surveillance by the state, requiring telecommunication and service providers to increase the data retention policy for the content of users' communications and metadata, as well as provide unrestricted access to users' data to the Federal Security Service (FSB) when requested. These amendments demonstrate Russia's prioritization of state interests over individualized liberties.

Regional Sources of Russian Communications Law

The Constitution of the Russian Federation

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1993, the Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted. Article 15 of the Russian Constitution states that the document holds the "highest legal force and direct effect" throughout Russia. It was created to replace the 1978 Constitution of the Soviet Union, demonstrating a shift away from communism and reduction of rights, towards a separation of powers. Prior to 2020, Article 15 Section 4 of the Constitution provided that international treaties took precedence over domestic laws in the event that the two conflicted. However, after the Constitutional reforms that took place in 2020 under President Vladimir Putin, national law now supersedes all international treaties and norms, including binding legal decisions. Article 71 limits information security and technology and communications to exclusive federal jurisdiction, while Article 72 allows for joint jurisdiction between regional entities and the state.

Regional Legislative Acts

Regional sources of Russian communications law stem from constituent entities of the Russian Federation, such as republics and cities considered to have federal significance like Moscow and St. Petersburg. More often than not, constituent entities may enact legislation relating to the development of information in society, however all acts must conform to federal statutes or the Constitution.

No region or constituent entity within the Russian Federation has authority to issue their own telecommunications or mass media law. Therefore, any legislation enacted by Russia's constituent entities are merely supplemental statutes relating to digital infrastructure and telecommunications. The legislation focuses on developing infrastructure while implementing federal programs and developing administration that conforms with the Constitution.

International Sources of Law

Universal International Law

The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is an international organization that focuses on ensuring rational use of telecommunications internationally. The ITU coordinates the standards for the global spectrum and the rights associated with telecommunication. Russia has been a member state of the ITU since 2001 and actively contributes and votes during ITU Council meetings and conventions. Russia effectively ratified the Constitution on June 16, 1994. The foundational ideas of the ITU Constitution are implemented in Russia through a multitude of federal laws as well as spectrum regulation.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a United Nations Human Rights Committee that aims to guarantee freedom of expression and privacy throughout communications, both analog and digital. Although Russia is still a party to the ICCPR, current constitutional laws and domestic statutes have contradicted the ICCPR principles and limited its enforceability within the state.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has invoked the UN Charter as the basis for claims of information sovereignty. This idea states that Russia's international obligations must not take precedence over domestic law when national security is threatened by communications, especially foreign.

Regional Law

For several decades, the European Convention on Human Rights and its subsequent jurisprudence has heavily influenced the application of Russian law. The European Convention on Human Rights has influenced strong debates within Russia relating to surveillance, privacy, and expression. However, Russia withdrew from the Council of Europe in March of 2022, pledging not to be bound by the established precedents.

As a result of Russia's withdrawal from the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights no longer has jurisdiction over any future violations committed by Russia. However, this policy does not retroactively apply, and any new cases against Russia may still be brought as long as they pre-date September 16, 2022. Therefore, although ECtHR case law and precedent no longer represents current constraints on Russian communication law, it remains relevant for understanding the law's historical development.

Principles of Communication Law and the Media

Technical regulations and state control objectives shape the focus of Russian communications law. The primary aims of the regulations include ensuring national security and sovereignty, regulating the communications market, protecting public order and morality, and protecting the rights of citizens. To ensure national security and sovereignty, the state aims to maintain control over the communications infrastructure and digital platforms while incorporating extensive oversight.

Russia seeks to maintain control over communications infrastructure and platforms as a way to advance administrative oversight and continue to promote national security and the sovereignty of the nation. Russia prioritizes information as a resource that can be utilized both as a way to learn about other countries and as a way others can learn about the inner-workings of Russian authorities. Therefore, Russia believes that digital information must be insulated from foreign influence through restricting dissemination.

Means of Communication

Under the Soviet Union, Russian communications systems were state monopolies overseen by the Ministry of Communications. When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, broadcasting and internet services became available to private citizens, however a majority of the national television networks remained owned by the state or by state-controlled entities. Under Article 71 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the radio frequency spectrum is a federal resource. Allocation and coordination of radio frequencies is governed by principles set forth by the ITU and its Radiocommunication Sector, with the coordination of frequency assignments occurring on an international level.

On a domestic level, the use of the radio frequency spectrum is regulated and governed by Federal Law No. 126-FZ. This law established that the technical standards to be implemented domestically were to be consistent with the ITU radio regulations, however the ultimate authority as to allocation and use was reserved to the state. This ultimately reflects the consistency of Russian communications laws to conform with the standards and norm internationally, while also remaining sovereign on an administrative and domestic level.

Over time, Russia began to shift away from democracy. The Russian state began to implement more limitations on content control and access to information. Through its membership in the ITU, Russia began to invoke Article 48 of the ITU Constitution that provided for states to permissibly take measures deemed "necessary for national security."

Comparison between Russia and the United States

The framework of Russian communications law focuses on the balance between administrative control and constitutional freedom. While Russia's Constitution establishes freedom of expression and other rights, the state's implementation of its laws creates conditions to the applicability of the privileges. Russian communications law upholds the prevalence of state sovereignty and control over information and communication, while acknowledging that information and communication can be a weapon of destabilization of state ideals. Russia enacts and enforces its communications laws with a focus on sovereignty, where information, not the individual, is the object to be protected from threats, both perceived and actual.

By contrast, the United States enacts and enforces its communications laws with a focus on individual rights, where freedom of expression, thought, and speech are protected and any intended restrictions must withstand strict constitutional scrutiny. United States citizens can access information, and any regulated implementation is not subject to restriction if it does not conform with the government desired content. United States regulation of communication focuses on the discrimination of viewpoints and encourages use of the infrastructure to facilitate access and competition.

Censorship in Russia

There is a fundamental tension in Russia's approach to censorship in the difficulty of balancing constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and the governmental priority of stability and security of the state. Article 29 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation establishes the importance to freedom of thought and speech, while also restricting any form of expression that unduly promotes "social, racial, national, or religious hatred." These conflicting principles and desire to control exemplifies the basis of Russian communications law and its subsequent treatment of the media.

Through the transition from communism to democracy, Russia transitioned away from state censorship towards more robust regulatory control. To support this transition, regulatory agencies began to rise and focused on gaining power to interpret and enforce communications law. These agencies utilized developing technology to block websites and restrict data access.

Regulatory Authorities

Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media

The Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media is the primary policymaker relating to information technology and digital infrastructure. They are responsible for developing strategies relating to the same, as well as oversees the implementation of federal programs that support the same initiatives. This agency, as well as most other regulatory agencies, is granted authority from the executive branch, with little to no checks from the judicial branch. The established structure of operation by the Ministry reinforces the notion that the executive branch plays a crucial and centrol role in determining what is permissible speech.

Roskomnadzor

The Emblem of Roskomnazdor

Also known as the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media, Roskomnadzor is responsible for enforcing the federal laws relating to the sovereign use of the internet, as well as to issue blocking orders. The agency is also responsible for issuing licenses to telecommunications operators and focuses on monitoring private compliance with content law. Roskomnadzor fulfills the state policy of censorship through filtering mechanisms to ensure that information being transmitted through the Internet complies with the messages that the state approves.

Roskomnadzor exercises authority by maintaining specific lists that detail prohibited content and may further require service providers to restrict access to certain websites and information. These regulations allow for the government to restrict expression at a faster pace as judicial authorization can be avoided. If judicial remedies were available, it would only occur after the content was removed, thus offering limited relief.

Federal Security Service (FSB)

The Russian government currently utilizes a variety of tools to control and monitor communications throughout the country, with the main technology being the System of Operative Investigative Measures (SORM). Russia's System for Operative Investigative Measures (SORM) is the basis of the technology utilized for electronic surveillance by Russia. The FSB is responsible for managing the state's technical surveillance utilizing this tool, which requires Internet service providers to install specific equipment that allows the state to access metadata and all user communications.

SORM is intended to operate almost entirely without judicial process, which is a stark contrast from other surveillance systems that require court approval for implementation or monitoring. The ability for the Russian government to constantly monitor private digital activity represents a chilling effect on speech and other forms of expression. Citizens utilize the internet with the assumption that their actions are being monitored and recorded, with the potential for later use in future punitive action.

Comparison to United States Law

In United States law, violent and offensive language or conduct is typically constitutionally protected unless it is considered "an incitement to imminent lawless action," a standard established in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). This standard requires proving the intent, imminence, and likelihood of the unlawful conduct at issue. Russia does not recognize a comparable standard. In contrast, expression may be limited in Russia simply based on the information or action's likelihood to disrupt public order, offend protected values, or contribute to state-prohibited extremism. If the state considers the speech to be destabilizing to society or politics, it may be restricted, without any reference to violent or illegal conduct.

Censorship in the United States is determined through independent judicial review. With respect to regulatory agencies, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates the standards of telecommunications and broadcasting within the U.S., however political content cannot be restricted under their purview. Unlike Roskomnadzor and the other regulatory agencies in Russia, the FCC is an independent agency that functions separate from the executive branch and its authority is limited as its orders are reviewable by federal courts. In the United States, censorship is an exception; individual liberty is prioritized. In Russia, however, censorship is the norm, with state interests superseding individual liberty.

Truth, Tolerance, & Unprotected Speech

Russia's communication laws demonstrate a clear shift from the approach of a market of ideas toward state-managed imposition of truth. Russia aims for maximal state knowledge while minimizing public knowledge and suppressing dissenting narratives. Russia's communications law is designed to fulfill the state's goal of preserving social order and promoting collective stability over individualized expression.

The Regulation of Truth and Information in Russia

The Russian Criminal Code Article 354 criminalizes the rehabilitation of Nazism. Communications or expressions that "disseminate false information about the role of the Soviet Union in the war" or "distort historical memory" are prohibited by Federal Law 80-FZ. Statements that are deemed to fit these descriptions are considered to be offensive and damaging to the memory of the nation, according to Russian courts. Russia presently controls all archives related to the "Great Patriotic War," under the guise that they are to be restricted as "state-secrets". This restriction on access has prevented verification of the state's claims regarding certain events and official wartime narratives. Russian courts have established that these types of expressions are inaccurate, as well as offensive to the Russian state and damages public order and morality.

The current Russian regime aims to transform history and control journalism to reflect a truth that is all but official. The approach directly contradicts the established European jurisprudence in Janowiec v. Russia, where the court recognized a right to truth to "protect the collective memory of the affected people," and El-Masri v. Macedonia, where the court recognized a right to know the truth. In Janowiec v. Russia, the court recognized that by requiring serious efforts to ensure transparency and clarification, individual interests as well as collective memory are protected. In El-Masri v. Macedonia, the Court recognized that victims of state misconduct and their families have a right to know the truth stemming from the incident.

Tolerance in Russia

Article 29 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation formally protects freedom of thought, speech and the mass media, while also establishing censorship as impermissible. However, Russia embodies a political-legal framework that prioritizes national security over individual autonomy. Freedom of expression within the idea of tolerance is only permitted when it does not endanger public morality or the state and aligns with officially recognized values.

After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, new provisions of Russia's criminal code were enacted that continued to narrow the scope of state-tolerated expression. Article 207.3 and 280.3 were created in order to criminalize the spreading of false information relating to the war and the discrediting of the armed forces. Convictions under these new provisions carried sentences up to fifteen years in prison. Additionally, in 2024, the provisions were expanded to implement further control and to permit property seized from those convicted under either Article to be confiscated. Tolerance in Russia was present only if the content of the expression strictly aligned with what the government considered to be reality.

Under this framework, tolerance is only recognized when the speech reflects the state's form of reality. Even if the speech is factually supported or politically motivated, if it deviates from the state regulations, the individual can face criminal sanctions. Therefore, in Russia, freedom of expression does not function as a right, but rather a privilege that can be revoked.

Hate Speech & Defamation

The constitutional limits on expression are further demonstrated in Russian laws relating to hate speech and defamation. Article 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation restricts the notion from Article 29, allowing for right to be restricted "to protect the constitutional order, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of others, and national security." The broad statutory controls on speech find their basis in the aforementioned constitutional provision.

Federal Law No. 114-FZ, On Countering Extremist Activity, defines the dissemination of materials that "incite social, racial, national, or religious discord" as extremist activity. The ambiguous language of the law provides authorities with a wide range of discretion to determine if speech can be classified as extremist, especially if it challenges historical, religious, or political narratives that the state has established.

European Court of Human Rights Case Law

1. Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (1996) - the ECHR held that a Russia journalist that portrayed the Jewish race as being the source of all evil in his journal publications could not benefit from the protection of the right to freedom of expression under Article 10.
2. Maria Alyokhina v. Russia ("Pussy Riot") - Members of a feminist punk band named "Pussy Riot" took place in a performance inside the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow in 2021. Despite the court's ruling, the case continues to demonstrate the notion that Orthodox religious space in Russia is entitled to near-absolute protection from expression that dissents against the Church's ideals.

United States v. Russia Comparison

Both the United States and Russian systems are intended to balance freedom and social order, however their presumptions and approaches differ. In the United States, through the First Amendment, there is a presumption of protection where citizens are subject to limited government interference except in certain narrow categories such as incitement, obscenity, or defamation. However, even within those categories, the law requires a high standard of proof and burden on the government in order to infringe upon the citizens' First Amendment rights. Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, public officials and figures can sue and recover for defamation only if the "actual malice" standard is met. In this case, the New York Times published an advertisement that was intended to solicit donations to contribute to the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and criticized how Alabama officials were treating protestors. While the advertisement did not specifically reference the city commissioner by name who was responsible for overseeing the police department, it exaggerated and provided multiple inaccurate statements regarding police conduct during the demonstrations. "Actual malice" requires that the speaker knew that the statement was false at the time it was made or the speaker acted with reckless disregard for the truth. This standard conveys a trend to tolerate harmful and inaccurate speech in order to protect forms of political debate and criticism of those in power.

In Russia, there is a presumption of regulation, where exceptions censorship is not automatically permitted and the communication must be demonstrated to be consistent with the interests of the state, as well as moral and social norms. Unlike in the United States, Russia does not have a proof of subjective intent relating to false statements and speech. Rather than encouraging potentially harmful speech in order to not infringe upon speech against those in power, Russia treats false and harmful speech as a threat to public order. This further demonstrates Russia's desire to prioritize and enforce specific narratives and state authority over autonomy of expression.

Cultural and Religious Expressions

Throughout Russian history, political authority has been closely connected to culture and society. Russia's approach to festivals and religious expression aligns with the broadest goal of the state to establish a system that conforms with traditional religions, promotes religious engagement and follows state authority.

Festivals and Cultural Expression

The Maslenitsa festival is a celebration to mark the welcoming of spring.

Festivals in Russia are considered communal cultural events as well as expressions of national identity. These events have been shaped by religion, state policy, and historical tradition. In Russia, festivals are intended to preserve the state's traditions rather than solely as a form of celebration. The events serve as a form of expression and social functions that uphold cultural belonging and political cohesion. They also allow for opportunities to celebrate traditions through music, dance, cuisine, and attire. With a focus on a reflection of the agricultural calendar and religious observances, festivals have brought out the roots of the community and the shared history of many cultures. The country hosts a multitude of festivals that can be categorized as religious, folk, or cultural. Some of the most popular and significant Russian festivals include:

• Orthodox Christmas - According to the Orthodox Christian calendar, Christmas is celebrated in Russia on January 7th. The holiday hosts midnight masses, elaborate decorations, and a multitude of Christmas markets.
• Maslenitsa - Also known as Pancake Week, Maslenitsa is celebrated in February to early March to mark the end of winter and welcome the arrival of spring. Live music, firework, dancing, and pancakes embody the celebration during this festival. The festival ends with the burning of "Lady Malsenitsa," a life-sized straw figure.
• Victory Day - Taking place on May 9th, it is day to commemorate the victory over Nazi Germany. The celebration consists of fireworks and military parades.
• "White Nights" - A festival that takes place from the end of May to the beginning of July as a celebration of the nights in St. Petersburg where the sun never fully sets.

Many of these festivals, especially those with national or regional significance, rely on support, endorsement, and funding from the Ministry of Culture. The Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation is the government entity responsible for creating policy and exercising power relating to Russia's cultural landscape. The Ministry oversees the preservation of cultural heritage, management of media content, and regulation of the arts. The ultimate purpose of the Ministry's authority is to ensure that Russia's cultural identity is upheld and conformed with across the country.

Russian Orthodox Church

Although Russia is secular according to its constitution, the Russian Orthodox Church has played a large role in shaping cultural norms. The Church exhibits significant influence over cultural and religious expression as one of the central cultural authority that is closely intertwined with the foundations of the state identity. Russian national identity has long been regarded as "inseparable from mainline Orthodox Christianity." After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Church became a restored instrument utilized by political leaders to shape policy and values. Multiple instances have demonstrated how the Church employed its policies to punish and restrict actions and works that criticized religious symbols or the state itself. In Maria Alyokhina v. Russia ("Pussy Riot"), a feminist punk band entered the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and performed a political song. The Cathedral was known to be associated with the Orthodox Church, leading to this instance of artistic expression to be criminalized as "insulting religious feelings" and involving a sacred space or ritual.

In 2003, an exhibit entitled "Beware, Religion!" was held at a museum in Moscow that featured artwork that criticized religious themes and Orthodox imagery. This exhibit was later vandalized and destroyed as the activists believed that it contained sacrilegious content. The Russian authorities charged the museum director, Yury Samodurov, and the curator, Lyudmila Vasilovskaya, rather than the activists, as it was believe that they incited religious hatred. This case was a clear demonstration that the desecration of Orthodox symbols was considered a greater threat to public order and the state than acts of violence.

Religious Expression

The prominence of the Orthodox Church allows for a disparity in treatment of minority faiths, as more and more emphasis and importance is placed on Catholicism and other "traditional" faiths. Other religions experience stricter registration requirements and face limits on the ability to promote religious gatherings.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was ratified by Russia in 1973, and Article 18 specifically provides for protection for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Under this article, ratifying states must protect religious beliefs as well as any manifestation of religion. States are only permitted to establish restrictions if allowed by law or it is deemed necessary to protect public safety, health, morals, or the rights and freedom of others. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also stated that limitations may not be impose for political or national reasons and cannot discriminate among religions. Under this framework, Russia's discrimination and disparate treatment against minority or "nontraditional" faiths has repeatedly been found to violate Article 18. In The Ministry of Justice v. Jehovah's Witnesses Management Center in Russia, the Supreme Court of Russia allowed for the dissolution of the Jehovah's Witness Management Center that imported banned religious literature into Russia and support extremist activities. Russia's use of extremism laws have been heavily criticized as inconsistent with ICCPR jurisprudence. There has been a lack of evidence to demonstrate incitements of violence that would otherwise justify Russia's actions under Article 18. It appears that the state is using the implemented measures as a way to control ideas, straying away from the ICCPR's value of non-discrimination.

Privacy and Data Protection

The modern technological and legal environment in Russia reveals a growing tension between state-sponsored narratives and individual identity. The current regulatory framework in Russia places emphasis on state control in governing information, communication, and knowledge, with national-security based justifications. Although Russia's Constitution provides a guarantee of privacy against unlawful interference in personal communications, Russia still employs a system where information management, surveillance, and secrecy are essential and central to state governance.

State Access to Information

Article 23 of the Russian Constitution recognizes the right to personal privacy relating to family life, medical data, certain private correspondence, and limited personal identifiers. The article was intended to prohibit interference with citizens' private life and protect their communications from unwanted intrusion. When considering what is "private," the state balances the information against national-security ideals, establishing a narrow scope.

Russian courts have established that in order to protection public safety and promote political stability, surveillance and disclosure by the government is necessary. In Roman Zakharov v. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights examined Russia's System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) to determine if it met the required minimum safeguards that the was required by the European Convention on Human Rights. In this case, a journalist who was responsible for communicating with sources and business partners of the publish company he worked for, believed that his communications were vulnerable to interception by the Russian government. After Zakharov challenged the validity of Russia's investigative activities, the Court held that Russia's surveillance did not include effective oversight or establish its necessity and proportionality to its stated goal as required under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Therefore, this case stands for the idea that there is a tension between human rights laws and Russian communications laws that emphasize national security over personal autonomy.

By contrast, information that is held by the state rather than the individual operates under the presumption that it is secret unless intentionally disclosed. Federal Law No. 5485-1 established secrecy for any information classified as relating to military activity, political stability, or intelligence operations. Authorities were thus allowed to remove or restrict access to specific security records, government data, and historical archives, even if it was established that public-interest would otherwise require this information to be disclosed. This further indicates a structural tension and impropriety in the way Russia governs information.

Control of Public Expression and Dissemination of Information

The Sovereign Internet Law enacted in 2019 enabled Russia to control internet traffic and establish Russia's internet as separate from other global networks. Russia has justified these actions as a form of cybersecurity protections, allowing Roskomnadzor to filter information that disagreed with state policy, block certain platforms, and monitor political expression posted online. These regulations have been used to restrict access to foreign social-media platforms, remove content that is considered false, harmful, or extremist, and suppress communications that speak out against the government and its ideals.

The digital governance framework within Russia establishes significant constraints on how dissenting narratives are circulated. As a result, any form of speech, information, or action that challenges the government experiences strict regulatory oversight in order to conform with the State's desire for ideological consistency.

Impact of Digital Technology

With the evolution of technology, there are new ways for the Russian government to assert control and promote a national identity while limiting opportunities for the formation of individual identities. The ultimate state goals of political loyalty and a unified national loyalty have provided the justification for Russia to create laws and utilize state media to uphold the state's traditional values. With the ultimate goal of regulating private communication spaces, Russia manages spam through a prohibition on unsolicited communications without user consent. However, enforcement of these prohibitions are rare, as indicated by the fact that roughly 31% of all spam spent worldwide originated in Russia and roughly 47% of all email sent in Russia was spam. While Russian cybersecurity agencies treat malicious spam as threats to national infrastructure, the protections stemming from telecommunications law and consumer-protection statutes fall secondary to national-security protections.

The experience in Russia clearly illustrates how an individual's identity can be shaped by culture and religion, but also by emerging technologies, the government, and surveillance systems. As technology continues to expand and develop, the tension between individual identity and institutional authority becomes more complex.

Right to Bodily, Spiritual, and Digital Identity

Public order rather than individual autonomy forms the model of Russian communication laws relating to personal, biographical, and institutional identity. Russian law treats identity as a resource that is subject to regulation shaped by the notions of stability of the nation. Legal restrictions aim to restrict identity from being self-defining and introduces new rules that control content and shape individualized expression within society.

Intellectual Identity

A substantial constraint on intellectual identity exists through the restriction on the dissemination of certain historical narratives. Multiple Russian laws establish legal consequences for the distribution of historical narratives that are not proscribed by the state authorities. For example, Article 354.1 of the Russian Criminal Code criminalizes the rehabilitation of Nazism, as well as the distribution of any facts, ideas, or interpretations known to be false, relating to the Soviet Union's position and role in World War II. Federal Law 80-FZ similarly prohibits any attempt to distort the historical narrative sanctioned by the state. These laws operate as tools of censorship and identity legislation that consequently restrict intellectual identity in order to enforce a consistent national story and promote loyalty. Individuals are thus legally discouraged from embracing positions and thoughts that conflict with the state's narrative.

This form of regulation allows the state, through legislation, to view differing interpretations as deviance and defiance of state loyalty. Intellectual dissent is considered a threat to social order and cohesion of the nation and as a result, intellectual identity of individual's is often reshaped in order to conform and align with the state promoted narratives.

Personal Identity and Reputation

Any form of expression that challenges or contradicts the country's identity, institutions, or history is heavily constrained. As Russia aims to protect personal reputation, the country's civil law strongly protects business reputations, honor, and dignity. Article 150 and 152 of the Russian Civil Code establishes a cause of action for persons whose social standing or identity is harmed through the dissemination of false statements.

Personal identity must conform to state-recognized cultural and religious sensitivities and conform to the traditional family values worshipped by the state. Russia has introduced regulation that governs sexuality, gender norms, and family structure in order to uphold the traditional values. For example, Federal Law No. 135-FZ prohibits any form of expression that depicts nontraditional sexual relations in public. This law allows for the designation of certain sexualities and gender identities to be considered harmful, thus assigning moral consequences to the realm of personal identity to ensure preservation of state-sponsored identities, beliefs, and culture.

Digital Identity

Over time, there has been an increasing emphasis and establishment of regulation relating to digital identity. The Russian government established the System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) to enable the FSB to intercept communications, ultimately breaking down any boundary and separation between personal identity and state observations. To use the internet, users must provide their personal information to be verified by the state authorities. Under the SORM, telecommunications companies are also required to collect, store and provide personally identifiable information when asked by authorities.

Federal Law No. 264-FZ provides individuals with the ability to request removal of inaccurate or outdated search results from the internet. This law was adopted under the assumption that incorrect and harmful information would distort personal identities.

Right to Reject Information, Clothing, and Human Exhibitions

The expression and communications regime in Russia reflects the long-standing tradition of state-managed information control that focuses on protecting political stability, maintaining a uniform national identity, and shaping public morality. Russia law treats expression as a regulated function of society, rather than as a default right that is subject to narrow limitation. Through clothing and identity, access to and rejection of information, and limits on bodily exposure and expression, the Russian legal system has structured a model where autonomy of expression is conditioned by state-dictated national interests, statutory purpose, and administrative discretion.

Right to Clothing

Russia's historical traditions and regulatory framework have shaped the way clothing is worn and perceived. Various types of clothing represent distinct cultural and legal significance, focusing on protection, identity, and modesty. Federal cultural-heritage policies have recognized that traditional garments will adapt to reflect different climates and environments, as well as provide physical protection.

Slavic folk costumes varied depending on the season and the resources available.

Federal cultural legislation has also recognized that clothing contributes to a community identity. Russia's cultural heritage has been upheld and expressed through Orthodox head coverings, Slavic folk costumes, and patterns that are unique to specific regions.

Russia has gradually shifted towards heightening the standards relating to narrative control, national-security-based speech restrictions, and moral regulation. Restrictions on clothing in public settings, particularly educational institutions, demonstrate the state view that clothing is not only an individual choice, but is a choice capable of disrupting societal norms and creating moral controversy. In 2015, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld a ban on hijabs in public schools. In Russia, public school students are required to wear uniforms, and the Court held that having dress codes in schools prevents social division, promotes educational neutrality, and assists in upholding societal expectations.

Russian courts have given broad deference to executive determinations, viewing regulations involving clothing as administrative policy rather than an adjudication of rights. In turn, the judiciary has emphasized a legal framework where the right to expression is inferior to the state's interest in maintaining uniformity within public institutions.

The Right to Access, Reject, and Filter Information

In Russia, the state regulates the type of information that individuals may access, as well as what information information is prohibited. Unlike other countries where the individuals determine information access and control, in Russia, the state determines what content must be blocked, what narratives must be conveyed, and what information can be circulated. Federal Law No. 149-FZ allows authorities to require digital platforms to remove and restrict content that speaks out against societal values and the government, as well as immoral or extremist content.

In Lashmankin v. Russia, a human-rights lawyer and journalist were killed in Moscow and later a "commemoration picket" was held in their honor at the Memorial to the Victims of Political Repression in Yuri Gagarin Park. The location of the memorial was specifically chosen as it was believed the murders were cases of politically motivated repression. The Court upheld Russia's broad administrative discretion to regulate public expression and justify state control over information in order to maintain social order.

Morality, Decency, and State Authority

Historically, the Russian Empire has criminalized the distribution of obscene materials, "public debauchery," and "offenses against morality." Any materials that could be considered to "corrupt youth or offend public decency" were expressly prohibited. Russian law considers public displays of the body closely related to religious sentiment, social harmony, and morality. Acts of indecent exposure or nudity in public spaces are considered to undermine and contradict social norms, offend the public, and promote public disorder. In settings that are culturally significant, regulations and policies are applied more strictly. Federal Law No. 136-FZ prohibits acts, both visual or performative, that are considered to insult sacred spaces. This law allows for the prosecution of demonstrations and protects taking place in religious venues or against sacred imagery and symbols. Laws find their foundation shaped by tradition and influenced by modesty norms stemming from the Orthodox church.

Russian regulations also aim to protect minors from exposure to sexualized content, pornography, or erotic imagery. The laws find justification in the idea that children must be shielded from adult sexuality. Federal Law No. 436-FZ, On Protecting Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development" established a content rating system and created a blacklist for websites that described or portrayed suicide, illegal drugs, or child pornography. These laws were challenged in 2013 as being overly broad, violating freedom of expression, and limiting freedom of information. The Court ultimately held that the laws restricting minors' access to information were constitutional because the state has an obligation to protect the development of children.

Throughout these areas of regulation, it can be seen that Russia's regulatory system formulates a state-centered approach to expression. It is clear that individual autonomy is only permitted when it does not conflict with state-defined narratives, national stability, or societal order. The regulations, no matter what are of culture, religion, or society they cover, prioritize tradition and authority. Unlike other nations, Russia does not presume or prioritize expressive freedom, but rather constricts its boundaries.